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JURISDICTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Ann Woolhandler*
Michael G. Collins**
ABSTRACT
In Hughes v. Fetter (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts are
ordinarily required—as a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Clause—to take
jurisdiction of claims arising under sister-state law, their own wishes
notwithstanding. Hughes remains a foundational case for conflict of laws and
interstate relations. It is said to embody the principles that states should
maximize one another’s policies, and cannot discriminate against sister-state
laws. Some scholars, moreover, have argued for extensions of Hughes’s
nondiscrimination norm to choice of law, to public policy exceptions to
applying sister-state law, and to Congress’s stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction. This Article argues that Hughes was wrong. The decision is
justified neither by history nor precedent under the Clause, nor by a policy
maximization rationale. And its nondiscrimination norm fits poorly with states’
general ability, in the choice-of-law area, to prefer their own law over sisterstate law in cases that they choose to entertain. This Article argues that states
should be under a much more limited duty, grounded in a litigant’s substantive
entitlement to redress, rather than a duty not to discriminate against the law of
sister states. Arguments that other scholars have made for extension of
Hughes’s rule of nondiscrimination against the law of other sovereigns in the
choice of law, public policy, and jurisdiction-stripping settings should
therefore draw little support from the doubtful result in Hughes.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution declares that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”1 The states’ obligation to respect other states’ judgments—their
“judicial Proceedings”—is probably the most familiar aspect of the Clause, and
questions as to the scope of that obligation have a history going back to the
early Republic. In addition, the modern Court has read the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as sometimes requiring state courts, as a matter of choice of law,
to apply sister-state law (their “public Acts”) in cases that they entertain.
Related to this requirement, the modern Court has also read the Clause to
require states to open their courthouse doors and take jurisdiction of claims
under sister-state law even if they would prefer not to entertain them.2
The last of these obligations—the door-opening obligation—is
distinguishable from the choice-of-law obligation, although the Court treats
both as deriving from the obligation to give full faith and credit to the laws of
sister states. The choice-of-law obligation merely tells a state that chooses to
exercise jurisdiction over an action that it might have to apply sister-state law
rather than its own law; but it does not tell states that they must hear the
particular action. Full faith and credit constraints on choice of law, however,
have proved to be quite minimal,3 whereas the Court has articulated a stronger
full faith and credit obligation to hear sister-state causes of action. In this
Article, we critique the jurisdictional, or door-opening obligation, of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
The Supreme Court’s 1951 opinion in Hughes v. Fetter is the canonical
decision establishing duties to take jurisdiction of sister-state causes of action

1

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
By “claims under sister-state law” and “sister-state cause of action,” we mean causes of action that,
under the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, would be claims arising under the law of a sister state.
3 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313, 318–19 (1981) (applying weak rational basis
scrutiny to a state’s choice of law).
2
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as a matter of full faith and credit.4 In Hughes, the Court required Wisconsin’s
courts to entertain a wrongful death action arising under the law of Illinois,
which the Wisconsin courts had refused to hear.5 The Hughes Court found
precedent for its door-opening rule in an earlier decision6—Broderick v.
Rosner—in which the Court held that New Jersey had to entertain an action
under New York law against New Jersey shareholders of an insolvent New
York corporation.7 Hughes and Broderick added a layer of constitutional
compulsion to what had theretofore been a regime of interstate comity, which
embodied a general respect for sister-state laws, but under which states
generally retained the option whether to hear claims based on sister-state law.
Despite the relatively late appearance of a constitutionally driven statecourt duty to entertain sister-state causes of action, Hughes has become a
foundational case for interstate relations and conflict of laws. It rests upon and
provides support for a notion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause has a largely
self-executing effect, respecting the obligation of states to apply the statutory
and common law of other states.8 The Hughes Court also stated that the Full
4

341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).
Id. at 610–13.
6 Id. at 611 & n.6.
7 294 U.S. 629, 647 (1935).
8 See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.3.1, at 151 & n.48 (2d ed. 1995) (citing Hughes for
a duty, based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to entertain sister-state actions); WILLIAM M. RICHMAN &
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 101, at 319 (rev. 3d ed. 2002) (indicating that
Hughes “makes good sense in light of the unifying object of that clause”). Other scholars have questioned
Hughes’s result or its reasoning. Brainerd Currie criticized the Court’s reliance on Full Faith and Credit, in
light of Wisconsin’s having sufficient interest to apply its own law. BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and
the “Transitory” Cause of Action, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 283, 287 (1963). He
would have upheld the result, however, based on Wisconsin’s having denied equal protection by subjecting its
own residents to an irrational classification based on where the death occurred. Id. at 304–07, 350; see also
ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 247 (5th ed.
2010) (indicating that, because Wisconsin had enough contacts to apply its own law, the decision was
questionable as a full faith and credit decision, and indicating support of Currie’s equal protection rationale);
Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Nontraditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 160–61, 168 (1998) (indicating that Hughes’s
nondiscrimination rule had been undermined by later decisions, although suggesting some support for Currie’s
equal protection rationale).
Although we do not believe the Equal Protection Clause would forbid classifying residents’ claims
based on where they occurred, our argument against Hughes’s nondiscrimination principle is grounded in part
on its discordance with the Court’s choice-of-law decisions. See infra Part IV.C. Russell Weintraub aptly
criticized Hughes on the ground that there is generally only a “relatively slight national need for according full
faith and credit to a sister state statute by providing a forum for suit on a statutory cause of action not yet
reduced to judgment.” RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.3A, at 710 (6th
ed. 2010). And Samuel Jordan has recently argued that the current availability of personal jurisdiction in other
forums argues against the continued viability of a nondiscrimination rule, and that the Court should focus on
5
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Faith and Credit Clause looks to the “maximum enforcement” of sister-state
laws,9 and stands for a principle that forum states cannot “discriminate” against
the laws of sister states.10
Moreover, scholars enlist Hughes to argue for a number of extensions of its
supposed principles. First, they have argued that Hughes supports a
generalizable nondiscrimination principle respecting the law of sister states,
thereby restricting states from routinely preferring their own law in choice-oflaw decisions.11 Second, they have argued that the nondiscrimination principle
should invalidate state public policy exceptions in choice of law, such as when
states deny recognition to out-of-state same-sex marriages.12 And third, in an
extension of Hughes into the federal courts arena, scholars have argued that its
nondiscrimination principle should prevent Congress from carving out federal
court jurisdiction over constitutional claims that it disfavors.13
whether a court’s declining jurisdiction would cause prejudice to the out-of-state claim. See Samuel P. Jordan,
Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1803–05, 1812 (2012) We agree with Jordan that substantive
impacts, rather than discrimination, should govern jurisdictional duties. See infra Parts IV.B–C.
9 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612; see Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide
a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L.
REV. 819, 836 (1983) (citing to the “maximum enforcement” rationale of Hughes as the aim of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, so as generally to require enforcement of other states’ claims, with exceptions such as for a
valid public policy objection); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Law, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1983 (1997) (citing with approval the maximum enforcement
rationale of Hughes); cf. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 143–44 (2010) (treating Hughes as
correct and standing for the principle that a “court needs some justification to refuse to enforce foreign
rights”).
10 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518 (1953) (characterizing Hughes as forbidding the
forum from laying an “uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum state”); Kramer,
supra note 9, at 1983 (indicating that the Wisconsin courts had inappropriately discriminated against sisterstate laws).
11 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 1985–86 (using Hughes to support a prohibition on discrimination in
choice of law); cf. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250–51 (1992) (arguing for uniform choice-of-law
rules based partly on the full faith and credit principle that states must treat sister states as equal in authority to
themselves).
12 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1966–67 (arguing against a public policy exception in choice of law);
Laycock, supra note 11, at 313 (same). See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83,
2695–96 (2013) (invalidating section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 249, 1 U.S.C. § 7, on
grounds that Fifth Amendment liberty and equality norms were violated by the federal government’s seeking
to injure a class of marriages that states sought to protect).
13 Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 825–26, 828–29 (using Hughes to support a general doctrine
forbidding discrimination against equal or higher sources of law and that also forbids Congress from stripping
constitutional cases from federal jurisdiction if it does not strip comparable statutory cases as well). Hughes is
also invoked to support state duties to entertain federal claims. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380–
83 (1990) (citing Hughes for the proposition that a state’s denominating its rule as jurisdictional could not
negate its constitutional duties to hear sister-state—and by extension federal—claims); cf. Haywood v. Drown,
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This Article takes issue with the decision in Hughes, including its claims of
maximizing state interests and its nondiscrimination principle. In addition, this
Article takes issue with those scholars who support Hughes and who seek to
expand it into other areas. Part I shows that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was long understood as not requiring states to apply sister-state laws, nor to
entertain unwanted jurisdiction over sister-state claims. Part II then traces the
development of a limited constitutional duty to entertain causes of action under
sister-state law in shareholder liability actions, leading to the Court’s decision
in Broderick v. Rosner. Part III discusses preludes to Hughes in the treatment
of wrongful death cases and in debates about plaintiff forum choice. Part IV
then describes the extension of the duty to entertain out-of-state causes of
action in Hughes, and responds to arguments by modern conflicts scholars in
support of that decision. Finally, Part V addresses and critiques arguments that
scholars have made to extend the reasoning of Hughes to other areas.
I. THE LATE ARRIVAL OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO SISTER-STATE LAWS
The modern Supreme Court treats the obligation to entertain sister-state
causes of action as part of the Constitution’s command to provide full faith and
credit to sister-state laws. Yet for many years, as discussed in Part I.A, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause was not perceived as commanding the states to enforce
sister-state causes of action, or to apply sister-state law in preference to their
own. Rather, such matters were addressed by the subconstitutional principle of
comity among the states, and by general rules regarding choice of law derived
from the law of nations. Indeed, as discussed in Part I.B, it was not until the
late nineteenth century that the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Clause
itself—as distinguished from the full faith and credit statute—dictated the
effect to be given to sister-state judgments. And it was not until then that the
Court also began to constitutionalize choice-of-law and jurisdictional
obligations as a matter of full faith and credit to sister-state laws.
A. Full Faith and Credit Revisionism
A number of revisionist scholars have argued that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not itself declare the effect that states had to give the “public Acts,

556 U.S. 729, 740 n.7 (2009) (citing Hughes for a similar proposition, in a decision invalidating a seemingly
neutral state jurisdictional rule that the Court saw as expressing disagreement with federal policy). This Article
addresses state duties to entertain federal actions only briefly. See infra text accompanying notes 243–53.
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Records and judicial Proceedings” of sister states.14 They argue that as a matter
of original understanding, the effect to be given sister-state judgments was
primarily a function of the Clause’s grant of power to Congress “to prescribe”
their “Effect,” and not a function of the Clause’s command to give them “Full
Faith and Credit.”15 For these scholars, the Constitution’s command merely
imposed an evidentiary rule that obliged states to receive sister-state laws,
records, and judicial proceedings as good or sufficient evidence of what they
purported to be.16 And in the case of judgments, for example, states were not
required to give them more than prima facie effect respecting the validity of
the underlying claim—consistent with traditional notions of international
comity.17 Instead, revisionists assert that it was because Congress had declared
the effect of state court judgments⎯in a 1790 statute implementing the Full
Faith and Credit Clause⎯that the Court eventually determined that states must
give the same effect to a sister-state judgment that the judgment-rendering state
would give it.18 Indeed, they argue, when it did so, the Court clearly indicated
that it was the 1790 statute that compelled such a result, not the Constitution.19
Although giving such a limited scope to the Clause may seem odd, the
revisionist argument is not without support. Among other things, revisionists
point to the fact that Article IV of the Articles of Confederation had included a
similar command that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given” to the “records,
acts, and judicial proceedings” of sister-state courts,20 but it lacked any
provision permitting Congress to prescribe their effect by statute.21 Litigation
under the Articles produced little clear evidence that its full faith and credit
command obliged states to give conclusive effect to all sister-state judgments,
14 This Part provides an overview of the work of several revisionist scholars. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl,
The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584 (2009); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in
the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2009); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998).
15 See e.g., Sachs, supra note 14, at 1206.
16 See, e.g., id.; Whitten, supra note 14, at 257.
17 The views of Professor Engdahl appear to differ from those of Professors Sachs and Whitten over
whether the Clause itself required that sister-state judgments be given prima facie effect. See Charles M.
Yablon, Madison’s Full Faith and Credit Clause: A Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 125, 128 n.5
(2011) (noting that Engdahl alone attributes such effect to the Clause itself).
18 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 14, at 1594; see also Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484–85
(1813) (holding, arguably based upon the act rather than the constitutional text, that states must give the same
effect to a sister-state’s judgment as that state would).
19 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 14, at 1649.
20 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. IV, para. 3 (“Full faith and credit shall be given, in
each of these States, to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other
State.”).
21 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 14, at 1594.
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as opposed to leaving the question to general principles of comity.22 In The
Federalist No. 42, James Madison stated that the phrase “full faith and credit”
was “extremely indeterminate,”23 and that it could be “of little importance”
absent improvements upon the Articles’ similar language—such as an
enforcement power in Congress.24 Similarly, during the ratification debates,
James Wilson stated that “if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the
effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place
among all Independent Nations.”25 As for the argument that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause must have done something to unify the states more tightly than
had the treaty-like Articles of Confederation, revisionists suggest that it did so
primarily in its grant of power to Congress to prescribe the interstate effect of
state laws, records, and judgments.26
Early practice also supports the revisionists, although the historical record
is hardly unequivocal. Initially, courts were divided over whether the full faith
and credit statute even required that conclusive effect be given to sister-state
judgments.27 But the debate (and its eventual resolution in favor of such a
result) would have been pointless had the Constitution itself been clearly
understood to dictate such effects. In addition, the first Congresses seemed to
perceive that the interstate effects of state judgments were a matter for their
own determination, rather than being decreed by the Constitution.28
We shall not rehearse all of the revisionist arguments here. But if the
conventional wisdom is wrong in supposing that the unimplemented Full Faith
and Credit Clause imposes an obligation upon states to enforce sister-state
judgments, then the Court’s anti-door-closing decisions are likely wrong as
well, at least to the extent that they are premised on the Clause’s
unimplemented obligation to give full faith and credit to sister-state laws.
Moreover, even if one adheres to the now-conventional wisdom with
respect to judgments, serious doubts about its accuracy should caution against
22

See Sachs, supra note 14, at 1224–26.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
24 Id.
25 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(Madison’s notes). Professor Yablon believes that, in context, Wilson’s statement was likely addressed to
declaring the effect of laws rather than judgments. See Yablon, supra note 17, at 169–70.
26 See generally sources cited supra note 14.
27 See Engdahl, supra note 14, at 1640–47. The Court eventually ruled in favor of conclusive effect in
Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813).
28 See generally Sachs, supra note 14, at 1231–76 (examining “The Legislative History of Full Faith and
Credit”).
23
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strong arguments being made from the Clause for a constitutionally driven rule
of jurisdictional nondiscrimination. Even scholars who are skeptical of the
historical accuracy of the revisionists’ evidentiary account of full faith and
credit to judgments have concluded that the evidentiary account may be proper
for full faith and credit to laws.29 And those in the early Republic—such as
Joseph Story—who seemed to suppose that the Clause itself might compel the
effect to be given to sister-state judgments, also supposed that the obligation to
enforce sister-state laws was a matter of comity only.30 A necessary corollary
of comity, however, was the principle that states could refuse to enforce sisterstate laws, and thereby shut their doors to such claims.31
B. The Absence of Resort to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
Furthermore, during most of the nineteenth century, neither litigants nor the
courts seemed to suppose that the Constitution obligated states to enforce
sister-state laws. In fact, arguments respecting the effect to be given to sisterstate laws as a matter of full faith and credit were noticeable for their absence
during this time.32 Some scholars have suggested that the want of discussion of
full faith and credit in the choice-of-law setting may be explained by the fact
that states long adhered to roughly similar conflict-of-laws principles with
respect to the common law.33 But that cannot explain the scarcity of full faith
and credit arguments in the three settings noted below—recognition of out-ofstate corporations, slave status, and sister-state marriages—where opportunities
for such arguments did present themselves. The lack of constitutional discourse
about full faith and credit to sister-state laws in general, and in these three

29 See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
485, 531–32 (2013).
30 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–
1986, at 70 n.115 (1990) (noting Story’s position); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 23, at 24 (1834) (“[W]hatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, depends
solely on the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter . . . .”).
31 STORY, supra note 30, § 23, at 24.
32 See Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and the Constitutionalization of Choice of
Law, 1865–1940, at 6 (Feb. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006719 (“The
notion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause or any other part of the U.S. Constitution . . . [was] relevant to the
field of conflict of laws, was almost wholly absent from American law prior to the early twentieth century.”).
33 See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 9, at 114 (“Given the territorial limits to the scope of state laws,
conflict between them was simply impossible.”); cf. Spillenger, supra note 32, at 26 (stating that because rules
of common law “were still regarded as universal in nature, there was little occasion for regarding a court’s
application of its own common-law rule of decision as an excessive or illegitimate assertion of the state’s
sovereign authority”).
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areas, suggests that the Clause was long understood not to dictate the force and
effect of the laws of one state in another state.
For example, states were not under a general obligation to permit out-ofstate corporations to conduct business within their borders, despite the fact that
sister-states’ acts of incorporation were “public Acts” arguably subject to
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Court held that the
extent to which states allowed out-of-state corporations to operate within their
borders was primarily a subconstitutional question of comity between states.34
The fact that litigants did not raise, and the Court did not address, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause suggests that it was not perceived as viable source of
arguments for adherence to sister-state law.
In addition, antebellum courts that considered the status of a slave taken to
a free state did not understand full faith and credit to have anything to say
about the matter, even though the effect of sister-state laws was at issue in
those cases.35 Rather, recognition of sister-state laws respecting slavery
remained a matter of comity, not constitutional compulsion.36 Indeed, a
proslavery treatise writer observed on the eve of the Civil War that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause “has never attracted attention” in the slavery setting.37

34 See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 525, 591–93 (1839); Spillenger, supra note
32, at 23 (discussing the lack of duty to recognize out-of-state corporations). To the extent the Constitution
was even brought up, discussion tended to focus on Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause or the
Commerce Clause—not the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Court specifically rejected an argument that
corporations were “citizens” under Article IV, entitled to equal privileges and immunities when operating in
sister states, stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not intended “to give to the laws of one
State any operation in other states. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or
implied, of those States.” Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). The Court did later hold that the
Commerce Clause imposed some limits on the state’s imposition of conditions on out-of-state corporations.
See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 652, 655–56 (1895) (upholding a Commerce Clause challenge to
particular bonding requirements for out-of-state insurance companies).
35 See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 32 (1981); id. at 306–07 (noting that full faith and credit
arguments were sometimes raised in state courts); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral
Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery, Gay Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 161,
167–68 (1996) (indicating that issues of slave status were matters of comity); Spillenger, supra note 32, at 24
(discussing slavery issues as an example where the concern as to extraterritoriality was that states would have
to entertain foreign-created rights and powers).
36 See Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Interjurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1855, 1880 (noting in the
slavery context that “[t]he American reliance on comity was not constitutionally required”).
37 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 196 (1858). Cobb noted, however, that Congress might be able to resolve such issues pursuant to its
power to prescribe the effects of sister-state laws. See id. This suggestion—from one who might be inclined to
get as much mileage as possible out of the Clause itself to protect slave owners—further supports the view that
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To be sure, the Constitution did require states to honor sister-state slave laws in
Article IV’s Fugitive Slave Clause by requiring the return of slaves.38 But that
was likely because Full Faith and Credit would not have required a state to
give effect to a sister-state law respecting slave status.39
A final area where full faith and credit might have played a role, but did
not, was interstate recognition of marriages. Recognition of a sister-state
marriage arguably implicated the faith and credit to be given to sister-state
“public Acts” or “Records.” But like questions regarding the status of a person
as free or slave, questions of marriage recognition were treated as a question of
comity only.40 And the basic principle, as remains true in most jurisdictions
today, was to recognize a marriage as valid if it was valid in the place of
celebration, subject however to a public policy exception such as for
polygamous or incestuous unions.41
The general nonreliance on full faith and credit did not mean that states did
not enforce one another’s laws either in a jurisdictional or in a choice-of-law
sense. As a matter of choice, states often exercised jurisdiction over other
states’ causes of action, and they also applied other states’ law, particularly as
to “transitory” actions.42 Transitory actions typically included common law
claims such as those based on tort and contract.43 On the other hand, states
were somewhat less likely to entertain sister-state statutory actions.44 They

respect for sister-state laws was not understood as a matter of constitutional compulsion under the
unimplemented Full Faith and Credit Clause.
38 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
39 Kreimer, supra note 35, at 168 (“The impetus for the inclusion of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article
IV was the understanding that in its absence, a free state would be entitled to treat a slave who escaped to its
territory as free pursuant to local law.”).
40 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 8, at 155 (discussing the long history of states’ use of public policy
exceptions to refuse recognition). See generally Wardle, supra note 36, at 1893–1903 (discussing the extent to
which comity was accorded controversial marriages).
41 Cf. Wardle, supra note 36, at 1893 (noting that comity was the “default position,” but “generally
yielded” in the face of strong public policy concerns). But see Kramer, supra note 9, at 1967 (suggesting a
constitutional obligation to recognize sister-state marriages valid where celebrated).
42 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 956
(2006).
43 See id. at 956–57 (2006) (noting personal injury actions were considered transitory, which sovereigns
could entertain as a matter of power rather than duty); id. at 957 (stating that real property and penal actions
were considered to be local).
44 See, e.g., Dennick v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 21 (1880) (treating a statutory wrongful death action as
transitory for purposes of federal court jurisdiction, but noting contrary authority in the states); cf. Monrad G.
Paulson & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 974 (1956)
(“Some of the early death act cases refusing to apply foreign law were clearly grounded in the notion that
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might characterize such actions as “local” (and thus a proper subject only for
the courts in the state in which the statute operated) or they might simply
exercise their discretion to decline jurisdiction over admittedly transitory
actions.45
As indicated by the above discussion, however, for the better part of the
nineteenth century the Supreme Court never clearly suggested that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause had self-enforcing effect, even as to judgments, and
much less as to sister-state laws (including both choice-of-law and
jurisdictional obligations). When the Clause was mentioned with respect to
judgment enforcement, it was generally in combination with the full faith and
credit statute.46 And the Clause was scarcely mentioned at all with respect to
enforcement of sister-state laws.
It was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that the Court
began to indicate that the Constitution on its own might require the
enforcement of sister-state judgments. The Court provided no explanation for
its move, and it was probably unnecessary given that the statute provided a
sufficient basis for judgment recognition.47 Around the same time, the Court
also began to refer to constitutional limits on choice of law,48 as well as
obligations to entertain sister-state actions—here, without explaining why it
should not await congressional legislation. We discuss these developments
below, focusing on how the Court eventually arrived at its principal precedents
for imposing jurisdictional obligations on the states pursuant to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.

statutory law was local in character.”); Spillenger, supra note 32, at 29–30 (noting that some commentaries
treated wrongful death statutes as local, but noting that Dennick treated the actions as transitory).
45 See Spillenger, supra note 32, at 30 & n.76.
46 See, e.g., Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 461 (1873) (referring to the Constitution and
the statute); see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888) (same).
47 See, e.g., Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174, 185 (1896) (stating that the
Constitution provides for conclusive effect to judgments); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 195 (1900)
(referring to the Constitution without reference to the statute); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221 (1905)
(referring to full faith and credit required by the Constitution).
48 See infra text accompanying notes 81–90; see also CURRIE, supra note 30, at 70 n.115 (noting early
twentieth century “suggestions” that full faith and credit applied outside the judgment setting). The earliest
suggestion from the Court was in Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1877),
stating that “public acts” would include a sister-state statute of incorporation.
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II. BRODERICK V. ROSNER AND THE PROBLEM OF SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
In Hughes v. Fetter, the Supreme Court imposed a general door-opening
obligation on the state courts, relying chiefly on the earlier decision in
Broderick v. Rosner. Broderick was one of the first decisions in which the
Court clearly held that state courts were under a constitutional obligation to
entertain sister-state causes of action, purely as a matter of full faith and credit
to sister-state laws.49 But as we argue below, Broderick and the precedents on
which it was based provided little support for the broad obligation articulated
in Hughes.
Broderick was an action brought in a New Jersey state court to enforce an
administrative assessment against the New Jersey shareholders of an insolvent
New York bank.50 On direct review, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the New Jersey courts could not refuse to entertain the action against the
shareholders.51 Understanding Broderick requires a brief look into shareholder
liability actions—actions in which creditors or representatives of insolvent
corporations could require shareholders to contribute to the payment of the
corporation’s debts. The shareholder liability actions that preceded Broderick
show that the Court’s primary concern in imposing a jurisdictional obligation
was to preserve the plaintiff’s ability to enforce what the Court saw as an
undeniable contractual obligation.
A. Corporate Insolvency and Shareholder Liabilities
In this Part (II.A), we first describe shareholder liability actions. We then
discuss the Court’s requiring forum states to entertain such shareholder actions
under the law of sister states by creditors (Part II.A.1) and corporate assignees
(Part II.A.2). In both instances, as shown by Part II.A.3, the Court relied on the
contractual nature of shareholders’ obligation, as well as the shareholders’
privity with the corporation against whom a judgment of insolvency had been
entered. The contractual nature of the obligation is further shown by the lack of
a requirement that sister states entertain directors’ liability actions, which were
not considered to be contractual (Part II.A.4). The importance of contractual
obligations is also reinforced by choice-of-law cases involving insurance
contracts (Part II.A.5).
49 The Court had, by the time of Broderick, already used full faith and credit in the choice-of-law area.
See infra text accompanying notes 82–86.
50 294 U.S. 629, 638 (1935).
51 Id. at 643.
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At common law, shareholders were not liable for the debts of corporations,
except to the extent of unpaid initial stock subscriptions.52 A number of states,
however, departed from the common law rule and provided by statute for
individual shareholder liability in the event of corporate insolvency, in order to
create a fund for creditors. These statutes typically provided for liability in an
amount up to the par value of the stock—a liability that was distinct from and
in addition to any amounts owing with respect to the initial stock subscription.
1. Actions by Creditors
Some states’ incorporation laws provided for direct suits by individual
creditors against the shareholders of insolvent corporations for this additional
recovery. State law generally required the creditor first to obtain a judgment
against the corporation. If the creditor could not satisfy the judgment from
corporate assets, the creditor could then sue individual stockholders for an
amount up to their statutory liability.53
Questions arose as to how far a sister-state forum—i.e., not a court in the
incorporating state—was required to entertain these creditor-initiated suits. In
1883, the U.S. Supreme Court, as a matter of general law, required a lower
federal court to entertain a diversity action brought by creditors against a
stockholder under the law of a state other than that in which the federal court
sat.54 Somewhat later, the Court extended the obligation to entertain creditor
suits against shareholders to state courts outside the state of incorporation. A
creditor had obtained an initial judgment in a Kansas federal court that could
not be satisfied against the insolvent corporation, and the creditor subsequently
sued a shareholder in Rhode Island.55 The Court treated the matter as one of
recognition of judgments, and posed the issue accordingly: “What then is the
52

See S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSOLVENT AND FAILING CORPORATIONS § 65, at
66 (1908) (noting that some states by charter had provided for such liability, in addition to the common law
liability for unpaid subscriptions).
53 See, e.g., Whitman v. Oxford Nat’l Bank, 176 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1900).
54 Flash v. Connecticut, 109 U.S. 371, 379 (1883) (holding that a Florida federal court must entertain a
creditor’s suit against a stockholder under New York law). The Court, however, did not indicate that state
courts were under a similar obligation to entertain such actions brought under the law of sister states, and later
noted a “diversity of opinion in the courts of the different states” as to enforcing such out-of-state liabilities.
See Fourth Nat’l Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747, 758 (1887); JONES, supra note 52, § 382, at 487 (“The
federal courts have been much more inclined to enforce the liability imposed upon stockholders by the statutes
than the state courts, and the tendency of the latter cases is becoming more so.”).
55 Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640, 640, 644 (1900). The judgment against the corporation
was from a federal court, but the Court treated the matter as no different than if the judgment were from a state
court. Id. at 645.
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faith and credit given by law or usage in the courts of Kansas to a judgment
against a corporation?”56 The Court treated the shareholder as bound by the
initial judgment against the corporation, although he could still raise individual
defenses such as having previously paid the statutory amount.57
2. Actions by Statutory Assignees
Another arrangement for resolving debts of insolvent corporations was
where a state’s laws prescribed special proceedings for certain insolvencies,
such as those of insurance companies. Such statutes might designate a statutory
assignee, such as the commissioner of insurance, to succeed to the rights of the
corporation. A court in the incorporating state would make a determination of
insolvency, thereby authorizing the statutory assignee’s gathering of corporate
assets. Where the incorporating state provided for shareholder liability, the
court would determine the necessity of the assessment, and the assignee could
then bring judicial proceedings against individual shareholders.58 As had
happened with creditors’ suits, the Supreme Court first directed federal courts
to entertain the suits brought by out-of-state assignees,59 but later extended the
obligation to state courts.60 The Court treated the shareholder as bound by the
decree from the incorporating state that the corporation was insolvent, that the
assignee possessed all rights of the corporation, and that the assessment against
stockholders was required.61
3. The Rationale for Requiring Enforcement of Out-of-State Shareholder
Liabilities
One might wonder how the judgment in the initial forum would bind an
individual out-of-state shareholder who was not personally served with process

56

Id. at 643.
Id.
58 See, e.g., Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516, 525–26 (1907).
59 Id. at 525, 534–35 (affirming the lower federal court that had taken jurisdiction, and also rejecting
Contracts Clause objections to changes in Minnesota law that provided for an assignee capable of suing in
other states, and thus making the contractual rights of the creditors more effectual). The state had provided for
a statutory assignee at least in part to get around the Court’s holding that equity receivers need not be
recognized in other states, because they were officers only of the court that appointed them. See id. at 525.
Unlike equity receivers, statutory assignees succeeded to the property and rights of the corporation, and
therefore could sue in other states to the same extent the corporation could have. Id. at 534–35.
60 See Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 261 (1912).
61 Bernheimer, 206 U.S. at 532–33. As was true of creditor-initiated suits, individual defenses, such as
prior payment, remained available. See id. at 528.
57

WOOLHANDLER_COLLINS GALLEYSPROOFS

1038

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

5/27/2014 11:22 AM

[Vol. 63:1023

in the initial action.62 This binding quality, however, followed from the Court’s
view that the liability of the shareholder “though statutory in its origin, is
contractual in its nature.”63 The shareholder, by investing, had voluntarily
entered a contractual relationship with the corporation (and by extension, with
its creditors) that included state law as to shareholder liability.64 “Upon
acquiring stock,” said the Court, “the stockholder incurred an obligation
arising from the [state] constitutional provision [providing for stockholder
liability], contractual in its nature and, as such, capable of being enforced in
the courts not only of that State, but of another State and of the United
States.”65
By virtue of this voluntary agreement, the shareholder was effectively in
privity with the corporation, and “the representation which a stockholder has
by virtue of his membership in the corporation is all that he is entitled to.”66
Thus, recognition of judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was an
important element in all of the creditor and assignee cases against shareholders
that the Court forced upon states prior to the Court’s decision in Broderick v.
Rosner.
These decisions, however, also implicated full faith and credit to sister-state
laws, not just to judgments. For example, in a case in which the Court required
a state to entertain an action by a statutory assignee against shareholders, the
Court held that “the laws of Minnesota and the judicial proceedings in that
State, upon which . . . [the] right to relief [was] grounded, and by which the
stockholders were bound, were not accorded that faith and credit to which they
were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”67 While
62 Id. at 531–32 (noting the problem of personal jurisdiction against out-of-state shareholders in the
context of receiver and assignee actions).
63 Whitman v. Oxford Nat’l Bank, 176 U.S. 559, 563 (1900) (entertaining a creditor’s federal court
action against a shareholder); cf. James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1509, 1527–28 (2008) (including stockholder liability cases as examples of where “the Court deployed
the Full Faith and Credit Clause by recognizing new forms of status, typically arising out of some kind of
enduring relationship”).
64 See Whitman, 176 U.S. at 564.
65 Bernheimer, 206 U.S. at 529 (enforcing the obligation in federal courts); cf. Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders’ Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 312–13
(1909) (characterizing the liability as quasi-contractual).
66 Bernheimer, 206 U.S. at 532; cf. Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.S. 319, 329 (1889) (“A stockholder is so far
an integral part of the corporation that, in the view of the law, he is privy to the proceedings touching the body
of which he is a member.”); cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the
Conflict of Laws, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 492, 517 (1909) (providing examples where the lex loci contractus would
govern liability of members of the organization as to third parties).
67 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 261 (1912).
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these cases went beyond simple judgment recognition, they did not apparently
entail a more general requirement that states entertain the statutory actions of
other states. Rather, the shareholder liability cases reflect the Court’s concern
to uphold contractual promises—a central concern of pre–New Deal conflictof-laws jurisprudence as scholars have noted.68 As Clyde Spillenger has stated,
the Court saw contract enforcement as “a universal prerogative belonging to all
individuals.”69
As noted above, when state constitutions or statutes in force at the time a
corporation was chartered provided for the liability of shareholders, the Court
treated that liability to creditors as part of the contractual obligations of the
charter. Accordingly, the Court indicated that an incorporating state
legislature’s attempt retroactively to abrogate such liability would violate the
Contracts Clause.70 Similarly, a forum state’s refusal to entertain creditor or
statutory assignee actions against forum-state domiciliaries for shareholder
liability under the laws of an incorporating state could nullify the contractual
obligations to creditors of the forum-domiciled shareholders. This was
because, at that time, individual shareholders would generally have been
amenable to service only in their state of domicile (the forum), and not in the
incorporating state. But the Court could not easily characterize the forum’s
judicial abrogation of the contract (by denying jurisdiction) as violating the
Contracts Clause, because that Clause only prohibited legislative impairments
of contracts. The Court in the shareholder liability cases nevertheless
eventually found a home for such concerns for contracts in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.71
68 See generally Stern, supra note 63, at 1512, 1521 (emphasizing themes of freedom of contract, vested
rights, and extraterritoriality in Lochner-era conflict-of-laws jurisprudence); Spillenger, supra note 32, at 3
(stating that early choice-of-law cases would have been seen as more about property or liberty of contract, or
extraterritoriality, than conflict of laws).
69 Spillenger, supra note 32, at 7 (stating that even after jurists saw tort liability as less universal “many
continued to see the right to enforcement of a private contract as a universal prerogative belonging to all
individuals (even if subject to reasonable local regulations), not simply a positive legal right held at the
sufferance of the state”); see also WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE 31 (2005) (suggesting that the Court came close to constitutionalizing what was then the
traditional choice-of-law rule that, in contract cases, the law of the place of the making of the contract was to
apply); Stern, supra note 63, at 1521 (discussing vested rights theories).
70 See Fourth Nat’l Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747, 755–56 (1887) (holding that state-of-incorporation
requirements for suits against shareholders had to be met in a federal court in another state, and indicating that
the modifications to those prerequisites did not annul that liability but only changed the remedies).
71 The Court used due process/liberty of contract and, to a lesser extent, full faith and credit in its choiceof-law cases. See infra text accompanying notes 81–90. See generally Stern, supra note 63, at 1548–49
(indicating that the Court saw its choice-of-law decisions as vindicating liberty of contract); Spillenger, supra
note 32, at 3 (also emphasizing liberty of contract).
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As discussed more fully in Parts IV and V, some modern conflicts scholars
argue that states’ duties to entertain other states’ causes of action are grounded
in a notion that states overall should advance the policy objectives of other
states, to the extent not inconsistent with the forum’s own legitimate policy
objectives.72 They also argue that states have a duty not to discriminate against
sister-state causes of action; if the forum courts take similar claims under their
own law, they should be obliged to entertain sister-state claims.73 But rather
than being grounded in a requirement that the forum advance the particular
public policy objectives of the state of incorporation,74 the Supreme Court’s
insistence that states entertain shareholder liability actions advanced a policy
of contract enforcement that transcended the policy of any specific state. And
rather than being grounded in a prohibition on discrimination against sisterstate claims, the decisions were grounded in individuals’ substantive rights.
4. Corporate Director Liability
Further illustrating the strong contractual roots of shareholder liability suits
was the different treatment of suits against officers and directors. Similar to the
shareholder liability cases, the directors’ liability suits involved the
jurisdictional (door-closing) question. Some state laws provided that a
corporate director or officer who failed to make required financial statements
would be personally liable for corporate debts in the event of insolvency. In the
course of giving a narrow construction to such a statute in a case brought in a
federal court in the incorporating state,75 the Supreme Court noted, with
apparent approval, that sister states universally refused to enforce such
directors’ liabilities.76 This was due to their “penal” nature—a traditional
reason for refusal to enforce sister-state law—which distinguished them from
the shareholder’s contract-based liability.77

72 See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 131 (indicating that states join together to further their
own domestic objectives); id. § 3.3.1, at 150–51 (indicating that the forum’s interests are not unduly
subordinated so long as the forum is only obliged to treat the judgment or cause of action the way it treats
forum judgments and causes of action).
73 Id. § 3.3.1, at 150–51; Kramer, supra note 9, at 1980–97 (discussing a nondiscrimination principle).
74 See Spillenger, supra note 32, at 17 (arguing that the lex loci contractus rule was not based in “concern
for the sovereign interests of the locus” so much as in the “common law’s conception of contract as being
private and consensual in nature”).
75 Steam-Engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U.S. 188, 191, 196 (1879).
76 Id. at 192.
77 See id.; cf. Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452, 458 (1885) (distinguishing shareholder liabilities as arising
from contracts).
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The Court eventually did require a state to enforce a sister-state judgment
against a corporate director in Huntington v. Attrill,78 where the Court reasoned
that the particular action was insufficiently penal to escape judgment
enforcement.79 Yet even as it required a Maryland court to enforce a New York
judgment, the Court indicated that there would have been no federal question
for review if the attempt had been to force Maryland to hear the original cause
of action: “If a suit on the original liability under the statute of one State is
brought in a court of another State, the Constitution and laws of the United
States have not authorized its decision on such a question to be reviewed by
this court.”80 At least at the time of Huntington, therefore, the Court seemed to
assume that there was nothing in the Constitution that compelled states to
entertain sister-state causes of action, even though there was an obligation to
enforce sister-state judgments.
5. Mutual Benefit Societies and Insurance
The relevance of contractual rights to the jurisdiction-forcing cases is
supported by parallel developments in choice of law (as distinguished from
jurisdictional obligations)—particularly in cases involving mutual benefit
associations and insurance contracts.81 In several cases, the Court on direct
review used due process and (to a lesser extent) full faith and credit to forbid a
state from applying its own law, or to require it to apply another state’s law.82
Because our main concern is jurisdictional rather than choice-of-law
obligations, we discuss these decisions only briefly.
A number of cases in which the Court required the use of sister-state law
involved insurance—either obligations involving beneficial associations,
which were effectively insurance societies, or involving other insurance
contracts. For example, in Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, the
Court required the New York courts to apply the law of the chartering state,

78 146 U.S. 657, 686 (1892) (requiring a Maryland court to recognize, in an action for fraudulent transfer,
a New York judgment for a director’s liability).
79 Id. at 676–77.
80 Id. at 683.
81 See Stern, supra note 63, at 1525–29 (discussing, inter alia, insurance and fraternal benefit cases);
Spillenger, supra note 32, at 7, 38–56 (discussing insurance cases); id. at 47 n.117 (discussing fraternal benefit
cases); see also WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, § 9.3A, at 697–700 (discussing the fraternal benefit association
cases).
82 See Stern, supra note 63, at 1526 (indicating that due process was primarily a negative doctrine, telling
a state that it could not apply its own law extraterritorially, while full faith and credit tended to tell the forum
state whose law it had to apply in these cases).
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Massachusetts, when a member contested a dues increase that a Massachusetts
court had previously approved.83 The Court relied on the doctrines developed
in the shareholder liability cases (discussed above) in reasoning that the
members had entered a voluntary agreement to be bound by the charter of the
incorporating state, under which the dues increase had been approved.84 And
similar to the shareholder cases, the Court treated the issue as one of giving full
faith and credit to the judgment as well as to the laws of the sister state.85 In a
later decision not involving a prior judgment, Modern Woodmen of America v.
Mixer, the Court, in a brief opinion, relied on Royal Arcanum in holding that
the forum could not increase the liabilities of the beneficial organization by
accelerating the payment of death benefits for a missing member contrary to
the charter and the law of the incorporating state.86 Thus, the Court in Modern
Woodmen quietly allowed full faith and credit to require application of sisterstate law even in a setting where full faith and credit to judgments was not
implicated.
While full faith and credit made an appearance in the beneficial association
cases, the Court more frequently invoked due process as the source of the limit
on a forum’s ability to apply its own contract law in a way that altered what the
Court saw as the bargain on which the parties agreed. For example, the Court
held that a forum violated due process when it applied its own statute of
limitations rather than the shorter contractual period provided in an insurance
contract.87 Using the longer limitations period “abrogates a contractual right
and imposes liability, although the parties have agreed that there should be

83

237 U.S. 531, 535–37, 544–45 (1915).
Id. at 543–44. Indeed, the Court treated the membership relationship as more than a contract. See also
Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) (“The act of becoming a member is something
more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicil,
membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting incorporation.”); Comment, Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes, 45 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1935) (noting that the beneficial associations cases
involved continuing relations that were statutory yet contractual); Stern, supra note 63, at 1528 (discussing
these cases as involving status).
85 Royal Arcanum, 237 U.S. at 544–45 (noting “how inseparably . . . the giving of full faith and credit to
the Massachusetts judgment is involved in the consideration of the application of the laws of that State”); id. at
545 (“[I]f the Massachusetts law applies, the full faith and credit due to the judgment additionally exacts that
the right of the corporation to stand in judgment as to all members as to controversies concerning the power
and duty to levy assessments must be recognized . . . .”).
86 Modern Woodmen, 267 U.S. at 550–51 (holding that where the charter provided that death benefits for
an insured who disappeared would only be paid at the end of the life expectancy under prescribed tables, the
forum could not accelerate the payment upon the person’s being missing for ten years).
87 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149 (1934); Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1930).
84
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none.”88 The Court reached such a result not only when the law governing the
contract was that of a sister state, but also when the law was that of a foreign
country89—thus indicating that the Court’s concern was more about interparty
contractual obligations and less about interstate obligations. The Court’s
reliance on due process similarly underscored the underlying substantive
nature of the forum’s obligation not to alter voluntary agreements.90
***
In sum, on the eve of Broderick v. Rosner, the Court had held that forum
states must entertain individual creditors’ actions authorized by the law of the
corporation’s chartering state to collect against individual shareholders to
enforce unsatisfied judgments against corporations. In addition, the state of
incorporation’s statutory assignee, armed with a determination from the
insolvency court approving a shareholder assessment, could sue shareholders
in other states. Due to the initial decrees of the incorporating state courts, the
creditor and statutory assignee cases simultaneously partook of full faith and
credit to the judgments and also to the laws of the incorporating state. The
importance of the notion of voluntary agreement to the shareholder liability
actions was illustrated by the Court’s suggestions that forums would not need
to entertain out-of-state causes of action for directors’ liability.91

88 Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. at 406–07; see also id. at 408 (holding that an “attempt to impose a greater
obligation than that agreed upon . . . violates the guaranty against deprivation of property without due process
of law”); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 154–55, 162 (1914) (holding that the Missouri courts
violated due process by applying Missouri law to loans made on an insurance contract that the Court treated as
made in New York, and thus governed by New York law); id. at 160–61 (referring to extraterritoriality
concerns, and to destruction of freedom of contract); id. at 161 (suggesting that such concerns had been part of
full faith and credit decisions); cf. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377 (1918) (holding that
Missouri violated Fourteenth Amendment liberty of contract by applying its own law to avoid the effect of the
policyholders’ later using the policy as security for a loan under New York law).
89 Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. at 408. But cf. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154 (1932)
(requiring a New Hampshire federal court to apply Vermont workers’ compensation law, but indicating there
would not be an obligation to apply a foreign country’s law); Comment, supra note 84, at 346–47 (arguing that
workers’ compensation cases were not contractual because many of the acts declare that the obligation is
independent of contract).
90 Due process also encompassed extraterritoriality concerns. See Stern, supra note 63, at 1526.
91 The Court also refused to require forum states to follow the law of the incorporating state as to
disposition of insolvent corporations’ assets located within the forum state. See, e.g., Clark v. Williard, 294
U.S. 211, 213, 214 (1935) (“Every state has jurisdiction to determine for itself the liability of property within
its territorial limits to seizure and sale under the process of its courts.”); see also Spillenger, supra note 32, at
19 (noting that it was hard to argue that a creditor had “evidenc[ed] his ‘intention’ to be bound” by the
bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor’s state).
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B. Broderick v. Rosner
The Court’s 1935 decision in Broderick v. Rosner served as the Supreme
Court’s principal precedent for its later decision in Hughes v. Fetter imposing a
general duty on states to entertain causes of action under sister-state laws.
Broderick had most of the elements of the statutory assignee suits against
shareholders that the Court had previously required states to entertain. In the
event of insolvency, New York law provided that shareholders of New Yorkchartered banks owed a liability up to the par value of their stock.92 New York
law also provided that a statutory assignee, the New York Superintendent of
Banks, would step into the shoes of the insolvent corporation.93 In connection
with the dissolution of a New York bank, the New York Superintendent sued
New Jersey shareholders in New Jersey in an action at law to collect the
assessments. The New Jersey courts determined that under New Jersey law,
their common law courts lacked jurisdiction over such an action. And New
Jersey equity courts apparently would have required joinder of all creditors and
shareholders, which would not have been possible given the limitations on
personal jurisdiction.94
Broderick differed from the earlier shareholder liability decisions because
there had been no prior judicial decree declaring the insolvency and
authorizing the assessment against the stockholders. Rather, as provided by the
New York statute, the Superintendent of Banks—in administrative rather than
judicial proceedings—had determined the insolvency of the corporation and
the necessity of the shareholder assessment.95 Thus, full faith and credit to
judgments was not readily available as an argument to compel the New Jersey
courts to entertain the Superintendent’s action.
In the Supreme Court, the Superintendent argued that the New York
administrative decision should be as binding as a judicial decree.96 If accepted
by the Court, this argument would have meant the administrator’s
determination of insolvency and the need for the assessment would have to be
recognized. Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court declined to reach the issue
of the preclusive effect of the administrative determination, but said that full

92
93
94
95
96

Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 637 (1935).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 638–40.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 646.
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faith and credit nevertheless required New Jersey to entertain the suit under
New York law.97
Many aspects of the opinion in Broderick aligned with the reasoning of the
prior shareholder cases. The shareholders had assumed a liability “contractual
in character.”98 They had submitted themselves to the laws of New York for
purposes of the assessment.99 New Jersey could not have a policy “of enabling
all residents of the State to escape from the performance of a voluntarily
assumed statutory obligation, consistent with morality.”100 Moreover, it was
unlikely that there existed alternative forums in which personal jurisdiction
could be had over the New Jersey shareholders.101 On its facts and some of its
reasoning, then, Broderick could be read as a relatively limited decision
requiring states to enforce what the Court saw as incontestably valid contracts,
the obligations of which were defined by statutes of other states.
On the other hand, some of the Court’s language suggested broader duties
to entertain actions under the laws of sister states. The Court stated, “[T]he full
faith and credit clause does not require the enforcement of every right which
has ripened into a judgment of another State or has been conferred by its
statutes. But the room left for the play of conflicting policies is a narrow
one.”102 What is more, Justice Brandeis reasoned that the prior shareholder
cases involved recognition of statutes as “public acts” within the meaning of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, although the cases had also relied on the fact
that there had already been judicial proceedings under those statutes.103
Brandeis claimed that full faith and credit to judgments was not the basis for
the Court’s earlier decisions, because the out-of-state shareholders had not
been personally served in the initial proceedings. Because of the lack of
personal jurisdiction, as “[a]gainst the nonresident stockholders there had been
97

Id. at 647; cf. Earl M. Maltz, Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Legal
Scholarship, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 533, 535 (2005) (indicating that Brandeis saw the Superintendent’s
assessment as analogous to a judicial assessment).
98 Broderick, 294 U.S. at 643.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 644.
101 Federal subject matter jurisdiction would not always have been available in such cases, particularly
given amount-in-controversy requirements.
102 Broderick, 294 U.S. at 642 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 643 (“For the States of the
Union, the constitutional limitation imposed by the full faith and credit clause abolished, in large measure, the
general principle of international law by which local policy is permitted to dominate rules of comity.”).
103 Id. at 644 (citing Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 252, 260 (1912)); see also Converse, 224 U.S.
at 261 (“[T]he laws of Minnesota and the judicial proceedings in that State . . . were not accorded that faith and
credit to which they were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”).
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no judgment” to recognize under the Full Faith and Credit Clause—only public
acts.104 But Brandeis’s characterization of those decisions was misleading,
because they had relied on the shareholders’ being legally bound by the initial
judicial decrees, by virtue of their representation by the corporation.105
Whether Broderick would come to stand for any broader obligation of
states to entertain the actions of other states, or would remain a limited
decision based on the special contractual features of the shareholder cases,
remained open.106 And in the years between Broderick and Hughes, courts
generally failed to invoke Broderick to support a broader door-opening
obligation.107
III. PRELUDES TO HUGHES V. FETTER
Hughes was a wrongful death action, and in this Part (III) we discuss
preludes to Hughes in wrongful death and other personal injury claims, as well
as in battles over forum non conveniens. Personal injury actions differed from
shareholder suits in that the plaintiff often could obtain personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in multiple forums. Part III.A shows that the Court prior to
Hughes had not required states to entertain wrongful death actions under the
law of other states (Part III.A.1). And while the Court did occasionally require
states that took jurisdiction of personal injury actions to apply sister-state law,
104

Broderick, 294 U.S. at 644–45; see also Brief for Appellant at 69, Broderick, 294 U.S. 629 (No. 528)
(arguing that the shareholder cases did not merely involve full faith and credit to judgments, for then the orders
would have been invalid for lack of personal service).
105 See, e.g., Converse, 224 U.S. at 260 (“The proceedings were had with adequate jurisdiction to make
them binding upon the stockholders in the particulars before named.”).
106 Contemporary commentary suggested that that the issue of the breadth of duties to apply statutes of
other states remained open. Most commentary combined consideration of the choice-of-law and jurisdictional
questions. See Maurice S. Culp, Negotiability of Promissory Notes Payable in Specifics, 9 MISS. L.J. 277, 288
n.45 (1937) (noting that the application of full faith and credit to statutes governing contracts was limited to
receiverships, stockholder liability, fraternal insurance contracts, and workers’ compensation); Comment,
supra note 84, at 351 (concluding in light of limiting decisions such as Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935),
that the “trend towards supplanting comity with compulsion is to be one of gradual, deliberate development”).
107 Typical of the post-Broderick decisions were actions by out-of-state officials seeking to enforce
assessments on in-state shareholders of insolvent out-of-state mutual insurance companies or banks. See, e.g.,
Gaston v. Keehn, 26 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (enforcing assessment on members of a mutual
insurance company); G.M.C. Hotels, Inc. v. Hanson, 290 N.W. 615, 616–17 (Wis. 1940) (enforcing “double
liability” on bank shareholders). Less typical (if not singular) was Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 164 P.2d 692,
699 (Or. 1945), in which the Oregon Supreme Court enlisted Broderick in support of its conclusion that its
state courts must hear civil suits for penalties brought by federal officials against federal price control
violators. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (“It cannot be assumed, the supremacy clause
considered, that the responsibilities of a state to enforce the laws of a sister state are identical with its
responsibilities to enforce federal laws.”).
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it quickly slackened any such requirements (Part III.A.2). Part III.B shows how
the multiplicity of forums in which plaintiffs could bring personal injury cases
led to an active debate about whether plaintiffs should be restricted in their
forum choice. A bare majority of the Court eventually approved the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.108 Justice Black in dissent, however, favored wide-open
plaintiff forum choice,109 with later implications for jurisdictional obligations.
A. Wrongful Death and Related Actions
1. Wrongful Death and Jurisdiction
Broderick would be the Court’s primary precedent for Hughes v. Fetter, in
which the Court required Wisconsin to entertain an Illinois wrongful death
action for a death occurring in Illinois.110 Broderick, however, provided only
equivocal support for the result in Hughes. As noted above, a forum’s refusal
to entertain a shareholder action might effectively foreclose any remedy
because personal jurisdiction could not easily be had against individual
shareholders in the law-supplying state. By contrast, a forum’s refusal to
entertain a wrongful death action under the laws of a sister state would not
foreclose relief because personal jurisdiction was generally available against
the defendant in the law-supplying state, where the death or injury occurred.111
To be sure, wrongful death actions bore some resemblance to stockholder
suits. Both liabilities were statutory; the common law did not provide liability
for death, just as it did not provide for individual liability of stockholders.112
The statutory actions for wrongful death and stockholder liabilities
nevertheless were both closely related to common law actions. The Court saw
shareholder liability actions as suits on voluntary contracts, and it saw
wrongful death actions as adding a remedy for what was concededly tortious
conduct.113

108

See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512, 517 (1947).
Id. at 515–16 (Black, J., dissenting).
110 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 610, 613 (1951).
111 It was also more likely that wrongful death suits would meet amount-in-controversy requirements for
federal jurisdiction.
112 Dennick v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 17, 21 (1880) (indicating that the wrongful death action was a right
dependent solely on the state statute).
113 See, e.g., Stewart v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 168 U.S. 445, 448 (1897) (“A negligent act causing death is in
itself a tort, and, were it not for the rule founded on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, damages
therefor could have been recovered in an action at common law.”).
109
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Dennick v. Railroad Co. established that the federal courts were capable of
hearing wrongful death actions that arose in states other than the one in which
the court sat.114 This and later cases relied on the common law and transitory
nature of the statutory liability,115 and distinguished instances of liability “for
an act in itself not wrongful, in which a purely statutory delict is created.”116
The lower federal court’s acceptance of jurisdiction over such cases was
essentially obligatory.117
The federal courts’ obligation to take such cases, however, did not imply a
similar obligation on state courts.118 Thus the Supreme Court in Chambers v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad rejected an attempt to force a state court to
entertain an out-of-state wrongful death action.119 A Pennsylvania plaintiff
sued in an Ohio state court to recover under the Pennsylvania wrongful death
statute for the death of her Pennsylvania husband from injuries received in
Pennsylvania.120 The plaintiff claimed that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause forbad the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of an Ohio statute to
the effect that Ohio courts could entertain wrongful death actions arising out of
state and under the law of such other state only if the decedent were an Ohio
citizen.121 The United States Supreme Court stated:

114 103 U.S. at 12, 21 (reversing a New York federal court, and holding that it must entertain a New
Jersey wrongful death action).
115 Id. at 18–19 (rejecting the argument that because the action arose from a statute, it was necessarily
local rather than transitory); Stewart, 168 U.S. at 448 (concluding that the action was in the nature of tort and
therefore transitory, and was remedial and not penal).
116 Stewart, 168 U.S. at 448; cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Nichols, 264 U.S. 348, 351–52
(1924) (holding that a federal court in California properly awarded the $5,000 “forfeiture” under New Mexico
wrongful death law, because the amount was essentially reparative not punitive).
117 See Stewart, 168 U.S. at 450 (reversing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and stating
“it must be held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain this action in the courts of the District for the benefit
of the persons designated in the statute of Maryland”).
118 While the Court stated that it had endeavored to show that the contrary reasoning of some state cases
was “not sound,” it also indicated that it was making a general law decision. Dennick, 103 U.S. at 21
(indicating that the Court would decide for itself, in “the absence of any controlling authority or general
concurrence of decision”); see also Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 605 (1892) (indicating it was
unclear whether the Texas Supreme Court would have allowed such an action, but holding the federal court
should entertain it as a matter of general law); Paulson & Sovern, supra note 44, at 974–75 (discussing state
cases declining to hear out-of-state wrongful death actions); Spillenger, supra note 32, at 29.
119 207 U.S. 142, 151 (1907).
120 Id. at 146–47.
121 Id. at 147–49. An Ohio statute provided that suits could be maintained in the state for death of an Ohio
citizen in another state, and the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the statute as excluding other actions for
deaths outside of Ohio. Id. at 148. The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the Ohio law as interpreted did not
discriminate with respect to the citizenship of the parties who brought suit (as distinguished from the
decedent). Id. at 149–50.
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[S]ubject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, the State may
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, and the character
of the controversies which shall be heard in them. The state policy
decides whether and to what extent the State will entertain in its
courts transitory actions, where the causes of action have arisen in
other jurisdictions. Different States may have different policies and
122
the same State may have different policies at different times.

The Court’s statement in Chambers, moreover, did not seem to imply that the
state had to have a strong policy reason to reject out-of-state causes of action.
Rather, jurisdictional and procedural rules were part of the sovereign
prerogatives of the states in constituting their courts, and required no special
justification.
Cases in which the Supreme Court allowed forum states to ignore a lawsupplying state’s attempts to make its jurisdiction over certain claims exclusive
were similarly grounded in the principle of the forum’s jurisdictional
autonomy. State legislatures sometimes provided that plaintiffs could pursue
the state’s wrongful death or workers’ compensation actions only in the state’s
own courts.123 When plaintiffs filed such actions in other states’ courts,
defendants argued that if the forum took jurisdiction, it would deny full faith
and credit to the laws of the state that created the action and purported to make
its jurisdiction over such actions exclusive.124 The Court, however, upheld the
ability of the forum to take jurisdiction if it chose to, repeating language like
that used in Chambers about the forum’s jurisdictional autonomy.125 It
followed that full faith and credit need not be given to a law-supplying state’s
statute calling for exclusive jurisdiction.

122 Id. at 148–49; cf. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126, 128–29 (1904) (holding that a
federal court could not have taken jurisdiction where Mexican liability for death was penal, and that it would
be improper to use Texas law to provide a lump sum rather than periodic payments as called for under
Mexican law).
123 See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, a New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1236 (1947)
(stating that there were many such statutes).
124 See Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 60–62 (1909).
125 Id. at 70 (quoting St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285 (1908)); see also
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914) (reasoning that the forum’s jurisdiction “is to be
determined by the law of the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a
statute of another State, even though it created the right of action”). But cf. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1149 (2011) (arguing that the nonhoarding cases are based on a
principle that the hoarding state is not allowed to discriminate against sister-state jurisdiction).
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2. Personal Injury and Choice of Law
Although prior to Hughes the Court never required states to take
jurisdiction of other states’ wrongful death actions, the Court eventually forbad
courts that chose to take jurisdiction from applying forum law in place of
sister-state law in certain circumstances. Similar to the fraternal benefit and
insurance cases discussed in Part II, however, these decisions tended to involve
parties who had entered voluntary agreements that, according to the Court,
contemplated the application of a particular state’s law. And even cases in
which the Court required forum states, after taking jurisdiction, to apply
another state’s laws, the Court indicated that the forum did not necessarily
have to take jurisdiction in the first place.
For example, the Court in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper required
a federal court in New Hampshire, as a matter of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, to uphold the employer’s defense that Vermont’s workers’
compensation law rather than New Hampshire’s tort law applied.126 Although
the Court was reviewing a choice-of-law decision of a federal court, its
reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicated that the decision
encompassed state courts.127 New Hampshire law allowed the employee to
elect the common law remedy, which the Vermont law did not.128 Both the
employer and the employee were domiciled in Vermont and the employee only
occasionally worked in New Hampshire, where the injury occurred.129 The
Court cited to the parties’ having entered their contractual relations under the
law of Vermont in ruling that the New Hampshire federal court had to apply
Vermont law.130 The Court, however, noted that “the full faith and credit
clause does not require the enforcement of every right conferred by a statute of
another State.”131 The Court gave examples where nonenforcement was

126

286 U.S. 145, 154, 159 (1932).
See id. at 154–55. The Full Faith and Credit Clause by its terms, however, applies to states and not the
federal government. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
128 Clapper, 286 U.S. at 152–53, 159.
129 Id. at 151.
130 Id. at 152 (stating that Vermont law provided that, unless the parties otherwise contracted, their
agreement would be presumed to contain an agreement that the Vermont law applied as to workers hired in
state to work out of state); id. at 159 (“If . . . the employee or his representative were free to disregard the law
of Vermont and his contract, the effectiveness of the Vermont Act would be gravely impaired.”). But as Clyde
Spillenger notes, Brandeis also may have wanted to move away from a rule of lex loci contractus by relying on
a notion of status. See Spillenger, supra note 32, at 60–62.
131 Clapper, 286 U.S. at 160.
127
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allowed, including where “the forum fails to provide a court with jurisdiction
of the controversy,” citing Chambers. 132
Despite such limiting language, one might nevertheless suppose that the
general trend favored more expansive state obligations to hear sister-state
claims as a matter of full faith and credit. In Clapper as well as the beneficial
association and insurance contract cases, the Court expanded duties to apply
out-of-state law when the forum took jurisdiction. And three years after
Clapper, the Court in Broderick forced a state to take jurisdiction of a
shareholder liability action.133 In addition, shortly after Broderick, the Court
held that a state must recognize a tax judgment from another state, despite
earlier precedents to the contrary.134
But the trend was not unidirectional. The Court soon backed off any serious
efforts to constrain state courts’ choice of law when the state courts took
jurisdiction.135 In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, the Court allowed California to apply its own workers’
compensation law although the facts resembled those of Clapper in which the
Court had rejected use of forum law.136 As in Clapper, the employee regularly
worked in the employer’s home state (Massachusetts), but was injured while
on temporary assignment in the forum (California).137 The Court did not
attempt to determine which state had the stronger claim to apply its laws, as it
had in another decision just five years before.138 Rather, the forum state could
legitimately prefer its own statutes:
[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved
some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith

132 Id. (citing Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148, 149 (1907)); see also id. (“A State may,
on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving
unimpaired the plaintiff’s substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere.”); id. at 156 (indicating
that Vermont “has power through its own tribunals to grant compensation to local employees, locally
employed, for injuries received outside its borders and likewise has power to exclude from its own courts
proceedings for any other form of relief for such injuries” (citation omitted)).
133 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 647 (1935).
134 Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 278–79 (1935); see also Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U.S. 230, 233, 237 (1908) (not allowing a public policy objection to a judgment on a futures contract).
135 See generally Spillenger, supra note 32, at 56–67 (discussing the workers’ compensation cases as
moving toward a recognition that more than one state had an interest in applying its laws).
136 306 U.S. 493, 504–05 (1939).
137 Id. at 497–98.
138 See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 549–50 (1934) (stating that
California’s interests were “greater” than Alaska’s, and that the interest of Alaska “[was] not shown to be
superior to that of California”).
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and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject
139
matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.

Thus, full faith and credit decisions were not necessarily heading in the
direction of greater forum-state obligations to enforce the public acts of sister
states.
B. The Battle over Plaintiff Forum Choice and the Development of Forum
Non Conveniens
As noted above, the Court continued to uphold state jurisdictional
autonomy (i.e., door closing) in personal injury actions into the 1930s. There
were, moreover, other reasons not to expect that the jurisdictional obligation in
shareholder liability actions such as Broderick would carry over to wrongful
death cases, such as Hughes. In the shareholder liability suits, as noted in Part
II, the defendant shareholders’ home state was generally the only forum in
which the plaintiff could have obtained personal jurisdiction over the
shareholders to enforce the contractual obligation. Personal jurisdiction would
not have been available in the law-supplying state—that is, the state of
incorporation. By contrast, in wrongful death cases, personal jurisdiction over
the defendant usually existed in the law-supplying state—that is, where the
death or injury occurred. Railroads were the predominant defendants in early
wrongful death cases, and would easily be subject to jurisdiction where a
railroad accident occurred even under premodern, restrictive rules of personal
jurisdiction.140 And individual defendants could, by 1927, be subject to
personal jurisdiction for automobile accidents in the state of the occurrence.141
The problem in personal injury actions, at least according to many state and
federal courts, was that plaintiffs had too many forum choices, thus leading to
139 Pac. Emp’rs Ins., 306 U.S. at 501; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague v. 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)
(taking a similarly deferential approach to state choice of law); Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547 (1934)
(“Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted.”); id. at 543
(seeing right to contract as of less moment); Comment, supra note 84, at 348 (noting the Court’s unwillingness
after Alaska Packers to hold that the law of the place of injury or of the contract would always govern, and
that—given the possibility of swamping the Court—the Court would proceed cautiously in requiring states to
give full faith and credit to sister-state statutes).
140 Cf. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 408 (1855) (holding that Ohio could condition
an out-of-state insurance company’s sale of insurance in Ohio on appointment of an agent for service as to
disputes arising from contracts of insurance on property in the state); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION
AND INEQUALITY 181 (1992) (indicating that, by 1910, virtually all states required consent to jurisdiction as a
condition of doing business in the state).
141 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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significant judicial and scholarly attention on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.142 For example, plaintiffs’ attorneys notoriously perceived New
York jury verdicts (whether in state or federal court) as higher than those of
other states.143 They accordingly brought actions arising in other states in New
York courts under New York’s long-arm statute, which reached corporations
“doing business” in New York.144 New York state courts, however, used
judge-made doctrines of forum non conveniens to limit this practice145—a
form of state control over its own jurisdiction that tended to exclude causes of
action brought under the laws of other states. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court allowed the New York state courts to dismiss a Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA) suit between two Connecticut citizens on forum non
conveniens grounds in Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad,146 despite having previously imposed a general duty on state courts
to hear FELA actions.147 Justice Holmes wrote for the Douglas majority:
“There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to often
overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking
142 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 14 (1949)
(noting that in the past, the plaintiff had almost no freedom in choosing where to sue, but that plaintiffs were
now largely free of a rigid venue system); Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 405, 418–19 (1955) (noting that FELA cases “undoubtedly constituted the most pressing evil”
leading to later legislation allowing transfer between federal courts). See generally PURCELL, supra note 140,
at 177–99 (discussing the rise of interstate forum shopping in the 1930s and ’40s). In addition, the Court used
the Commerce Clause to restrict plaintiff forum choices in several cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers Coop.
Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 313–14, 317 (1923) (holding that subjecting a railroad corporation to suit based on
its having an agent in the state, in which neither party resided, and when the cause of action arose elsewhere,
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce); see also Comment, supra note 123, at 1238–39 (discussing
Davis and other Commerce Clause cases and concluding that the Commerce Clause doctrine “approach[ed] the
doctrine of forum non conveniens”).
143 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947) (noting that the plaintiff had argued for
retaining the New York forum because a claim for close to $400,000 would “stagger the imagination” of a
Lynchburg, Virginia, jury); PURCELL, supra note 140, at 187 (noting during the 1930s and ’40s, New York,
California, Illinois, and Minnesota were “importing centers” of litigation); Note, The Effects of “Full Faith
and Credit” and “Erie” on State Refusals to Entertain Foreign Statutory Claims, 61 YALE L.J. 1206, 1211
n.36 (1952) (discussing Chicago’s attraction for cases due to desire for an urban jury and noting that the desire
for an urban jury led to a preference for state over federal courts in some FELA cases, because federal courts
drew from larger areas that included rural jurors).
144 See Comment, Discretionary Exercise of Jurisdiction of Suits Between Non-resident Parties in New
York, 37 YALE L.J. 983, 986 (1928) (indicating that prior to 1913, New York law provided that “a foreign
corporation could not be sued by a non-resident unless the cause of action arose” in New York or the subject
matter was in New York, but that a 1913 amendment allowed suit by nonresidents when the corporation “‘is
doing business in the state’”).
145 Id. at 986–87.
146 279 U.S. 377, 385, 387–88 (1929).
147 See Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1912).
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it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.”148 The Court,
moreover, subsequently approved federal courts’ general use of forum non
conveniens in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert149 and Koster v. Lumberman’s Mutual
Casualty Co.150 Forum non conveniens, of course, is a form of door closing,
yet it was one with which the Court seemed comfortable.
As indicated by the 5–4 splits in Gilbert and Koster, however, some
justices saw the plaintiff as having a right to sue wherever she satisfied
personal jurisdiction and venue, and the dissenting judges would have rejected
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.151 Prior to Gilbert and Koster,
those justices favoring broad plaintiff forum choice had garnered a majority in
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Kepner.152 The Kepner Court held that the
FELA’s special venue provisions, allowing venue, inter alia, where “the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing [the] action”
implicitly prohibited use of forum non conveniens in the federal courts so long
as the FELA’s statutory venue provisions were satisfied.153 “[R]easons of
convenience or expense,” reasoned the Court, should not frustrate the
“privilege of venue.”154 When the pro–forum non conveniens justices later won
majorities in Gilbert and Koster, Justice Black in dissent echoed themes from
Kepner, stating, “Neither the venue statute nor the statute which has governed
jurisdiction since 1789 contains any indication or implication that a federal
district court, once satisfied that jurisdiction and venue requirements have been
met, may decline to exercise its jurisdiction.”155
148 Douglas, 279 U.S. at 387. But cf. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 343 (5th ed. 2010)
(indicating it may no longer be an adequate justification to deny jurisdiction on the ground that noncitizens do
not pay for the court system).
149 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947).
150 330 U.S. 518, 531–32 (1947).
151 See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 142, at 12–19 (discussing the differing positions of Black and
Frankfurter).
152 314 U.S. 44, 53–54 (1941).
153 See id. at 49, 52–54 (internal quotation mark omitted). The special provision had superseded the use of
the general federal-question venue provisions that only provided venue where the defendant was an inhabitant.
Id. at 49 (citing Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65).
154 Id. at 54. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that other special venue provisions had been read as
allowing for forum non conveniens, and that the expansion of venue was not intended “to give a plaintiff an
absolute and unqualified right to compel trial of his action in any of the specified places he chooses.” Id. at 56–
57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 702 (1942) (prohibiting a state
court from enjoining a citizen from pursuing an FELA action in another state court, relying on the language of
the statute that removal to federal court was not allowed); cf. United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S.
573, 574–75, 596–97 (1948) (holding that forum non conveniens could not be used given the Clayton Act’s
particular venue provisions).
155 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 513 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Justice Black’s view that the exercise of federal jurisdiction was
mandatory, however, contrasted markedly with his support for federal court
abstention in favor of state court jurisdiction. It was Black who authored
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., in which the Court held that the federal courts should
abstain from exercising their diversity and federal question jurisdiction when
an oil company sought to enjoin a Texas administrative ruling that the
company claimed violated state law and federal due process by overallocating
drilling rights to smaller producers.156 Black’s inconsistency was not lost on
the majority that approved forum non conveniens in Gilbert and Koster. Justice
Jackson, writing for the majority in Gilbert, observed that in Burford the Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction “[o]n substantially forum non conveniens
grounds.”157
Black responded in his Gilbert dissent that abstention was appropriate for
cases in admiralty and equity, but not for actions seeking money damages such
as Gilbert.158 He had more explaining to do in Koster, in which he argued in
dissent that the federal courts should not use forum non conveniens in an
equity derivative action. Black explained that abstention was generally
inappropriate where, as in Koster, the equitable remedies were sought against a
multistate corporation.159 This presumably served to distinguish Burford,
where a multistate corporation was the plaintiff seeking equitable relief in
federal court.160
Justice Black lost the campaign against forum non conveniens in 1948,
when Congress statutorily authorized transfer between federal district courts
based on essentially forum non conveniens grounds.161 Congress thereby
156

319 U.S. 315, 316–17, 332–34 (1943).
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 505; see also Comment, supra note 123, at 1244–45 (treating abstention as a form
of forum non conveniens).
158 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 513–14 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 515 (“No such discretionary authority to
decline to decide a case, however, has, before today, been vested in federal courts in actions for money
judgments deriving from statutes or the common law.”).
159 Koster, 330 U.S. at 532–33 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating, “There may be rare instances in which a
federal court could decline to provide an equitable remedy against multi-state corporate defendants,” but
indicating that shareholder suits should not generally be subject to forum non conveniens); cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 323–24 (1945) (Black, J., concurring) (objecting to the minimum contacts
approach to personal jurisdiction because “the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without any ‘ifs’ or
‘buts,’ a power to . . . open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business
in those States”).
160 Cf. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 512 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The defendant corporation is organized under the
laws of Pennsylvania, but is qualified to do business and maintains an office in New York [where suit was
brought]. Plaintiff is an individual residing and doing business in Virginia.”).
161 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 626, 62 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012)).
157
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approved the result in Gilbert and Koster and disapproved the result in Kepner,
which had held forum non conveniens unavailable in FELA cases.162 Yet for
Black, other avenues would remain open to vindicate plaintiffs’ forum choice,
and that is where Hughes v. Fetter comes in.
IV. HUGHES V. FETTER AND ITS RATIONALES
A. The Court’s Opinion
Hughes v. Fetter was a wrongful death action brought in the Wisconsin
state courts, over a death that had occurred in an Illinois automobile
accident.163 All parties to the suit were Wisconsin residents.164 Wisconsin had a
wrongful death statute, but only “for a death caused in this state.”165 The
plaintiff’s action was therefore based on the Illinois wrongful death statute that
was limited to deaths occurring in Illinois.166 The Wisconsin trial court
dismissed the action and the state supreme court affirmed.167 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court relied, inter alia, on Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
(discussed in Part III.A.1), in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a
Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to a state refusal to entertain an
out-of-state wrongful death action.168 While noting that the Wisconsin courts
162 Bickel, supra note 142, at 15–16 & n.21 (noting that the 1948 Revisers said that Kepner showed the
need for such a provision).
163 341 U.S. 609, 610 (1951).
164 Id. at 613.
165 Id. at 610 & n.2 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (1949)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
166 Id. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
167 Hughes v. Fetter, 42 N.W.2d 452, 453, 456 (Wis. 1950), rev’d, 341 U.S. 609; see also Hughes, 341
U.S. at 610. Although the trial court’s dismissal was on “on the merits,” see id., the dismissal was essentially
jurisdictional and did not necessarily indicate that the plaintiff could not refile the action in Illinois. See
Hughes, 42 N.W.2d at 456 (affirming the trial court’s dismissal by stating, “[t]he defendants’ motion for
summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint was properly granted,” but not indicating that the
dismissal was “on the merits”); WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 708 n.244 (stating that the Wisconsin court’s
dismissal “was intended only to bar further suit in Wisconsin”); Kramer, supra note 9, at 1982 (noting that
Black’s opinion did not rely on the merits dismissal). Some scholars, however, treat the dismissal on the merits
as central to the Court’s decision. See, e.g., CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 181 (2010)
(indicating that the real problem with Hughes was the merits dismissal); Jordan, supra note 8, at 1803–05
(arguing that the merits dismissal should be seen as central to Hughes’s result, because the resulting judgment
“creates a virtually insurmountable barrier to vindicating the claim”); Borchers, supra note 8, at 168 (seeing
Hughes as presenting a possible equal protection violation because the case was a total loss for the plaintiff).
The Court’s later application of Hughes to reverse a jurisdictional dismissal in First National Bank v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 397–98 (1952), provides evidence that Hughes was not based on the “merits”
dismissal.
168 See Hughes, 42 N.W.2d at 453–54; Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 146–48, 151
(1907).
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would ordinarily give comity to claims arising under sister-state law, they
would not do so when it was against the public policy of the state.169 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the territorial limitation in
Wisconsin’s wrongful death action expressed a state policy not to entertain
wrongful death actions arising in sister states, under sister-state law.170 In a 5–4
opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin judgment,
and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Wisconsin to entertain
the Illinois statutory cause of action.171
The case obviously vindicated the plaintiff’s forum choice. But
constructing an argument that the Constitution or federal law required states to
honor the plaintiff’s forum choice faced several difficulties. Among those was
the Court’s past approval of state courts’ use of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens even as to federal claims, as well as the Court’s and Congress’s
more recent authorization of federal courts’ general use of that doctrine.
Perhaps for this reason, Justice Black did not rely on a plaintiff forum choice
rationale in Hughes.
In addition, Black explicitly rejected a characterization of the case as
involving “a conflict between the public policies of two or more states”172—a
characterization that the Court sometimes used in horizontal choice-of-law
cases.173 Such a characterization would have made it hard to insist that
Wisconsin entertain the action, given that the Court had moved in the direction
of allowing forum states leeway to prefer their own policies over conflicting
out-of-state policies in choice-of-law cases such as Pacific Employers.174
Rather, Black recharacterized the conflict as one pitting national policy against
parochial preferences:

169

Hughes, 42 N.W.2d at 454.
See id. at 453–56.
171 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611 n.6, 613–14 (indicating that reliance on Chambers was “misplaced” because
no full faith and credit problem was raised).
172 Id. at 611–12.
173 See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); see also Alaska
Packers Ass’n. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (stating that “where the policy of one
state statute comes into conflict with that of another, the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting
interests of the two states is still more apparent”).
174 See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 620 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (“There is no support, either in reason or in
the cases, for holding that this Court is to make a de novo choice between the policies underlying the laws of
Wisconsin and Illinois.”); see also Note, supra note 143, at 1207 & n.7 (treating Alaska Packers as suggesting
a balancing approach between the interests of sister states, but noting that, in Hughes, the Court balanced the
state interest against the national interest).
170
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On the one hand is the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full
Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in
each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the
statutes of sister states; on the other is the policy of Wisconsin, as
interpreted by its highest court, against permitting Wisconsin courts
175
to entertain this wrongful death action.

By stating the competing interests the way he did, it was almost inevitable that
Black would conclude that “Wisconsin’s policy must give way.”176
Much of the rest of the Court’s one-paragraph rationale was spent
quarreling with the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s finding that the state actually
had a policy against hearing a claim like the one before it. For example, Justice
Black denied that the state was antagonistic to wrongful death claims “in
general,” because it heard wrongful death claims under Wisconsin law.177 In
addition, although the Court was prepared to “assume” that doctrines such as
forum non conveniens might provide a valid excuse for declining to hear a
claim arising under a sister-state law, it denied that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court could validly have dismissed the action on forum non conveniens
grounds, because all the parties were Wisconsin citizens.178
B. The “Maximum Enforcement” Rationale
The core of the Hughes decision was the supposed national policy of
“looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or

175

Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
Id. For some scholarly criticisms of Hughes, see supra note 8.
177 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612. Justice Black also cited to an ALR article surveying state-law public policy
objections to hearing sister-state claims, and suggested that possible differences between the two states’
wrongful death statutes regarding “maximum recovery and disposition of the proceeds of suit” were “generally
considered [as] unimportant” when states decided whether to entertain other states’ wrongful death actions. Id.
at 612 n.11.
178 Id. at 612–13. The Court added that “in other cases” Wisconsin might be the only state in which
jurisdiction could be had over all of the defendants in an out-of-state wrongful death claim. Id. at 613 (stating
it was “relevant, although not crucial here,” that Wisconsin might be “the only jurisdiction in which service
could be had as an original matter on the insurance company defendant”). That personal jurisdiction
difficulties were not Justice Black’s central concern, however, was indicated by his later opinion for the Court
in First National Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952). There the Court invalidated an Illinois
law excluding out-of-state wrongful death claims, despite the statutory provision to ensure that a forum was
available in the state of the death. Id. at 397–98. Justice Black stated, “The reasons supporting our invalidation
of Wisconsin’s statute [in Hughes] apply with equal force to that of Illinois. . . . Nor is it crucial here that
Illinois only excludes cases that can be tried in other states.” Id. at 398; see also WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at
709 n.246 (citing First National Bank as indicating that the reversal in Hughes was not based on personal
jurisdiction problems).
176
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rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states.”179 This rationale
seemingly conforms to what many modern conflict-of-laws scholars consider
to be the aim of choice-of-law and full faith and credit rules: maximizing all
states’ policies to the maximum extent.180 Prominent conflict-of-laws scholars,
therefore, have agreed with Hughes and its maximum enforcement rationale.181
1. “Grand Bargain” Methodology
Assuming one takes as a given that conflicts principles should maximize all
states’ policies to the maximum extent, how does one determine whether a
particular rule or practice produces such a maximizing result, particularly
given that maximizing one state’s policies may trench on other states’ policies?
A number of contemporary scholars have argued that the maximum
enforcement policy requires imagining what states would agree to if they could
overcome collective action problems.182 This technique derives from William
Baxter’s proposals for resolving choice-of-law issues by such imaginary
bargains. Baxter’s methodology in choice-of-law decisions requires a court to
determine which state’s policies would suffer greater impairment if the other
state’s law were to apply, and it assumes that the states would agree to results
leading to less overall impairment of state policies.183 While scholars have
critiqued aspects of Baxter’s methodology—particularly the use of
comparative impairment of different states’ policies in case-by-case choice of
179

341 U.S. at 612.
See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 132 (stating that states “put judicial resources at the disposal of
the interstate system as a whole, anticipating that by pooling their efforts, all states stand better chances of
furthering their own domestic priorities”); id. § 4, at 174 (indicating that choice of law should aim “to
maximize all of the objectives that states have chosen for themselves”); Larry Kramer, On the Need for a
Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2145 (1991) (“To maximize state policies, we must
determine which cases states care about and arrange tradeoffs to secure the application of each state’s law in as
many of these as possible. . . . Maximizing the interests of different states can be done only on a more
wholesale basis: by identifying generally shared policies or policy preferences and constructing rules that
systematically advance these.”).
181 See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836 (citing to the “maximum enforcement” rationale of
Hughes as the aim of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, so as generally to require enforcement of other states’
claims, with exceptions such for valid public policy objections); Kramer, supra note 9, at 1983 (citing with
approval the maximum enforcement rationale of Hughes).
182 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 280 (1990) (stating that
the theoretical framework for the choice-of-law canons he recommends “is a constructive multistate choice of
law compact—the kind of agreement states would probably make if they were to negotiate”).
183 William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (1963); cf.
William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflicts of Laws: Baxter’s
Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (1999) (noting that Baxter sought a
law and economics approach that would maximize states’ substantive policies, and might now favor the First
Restatement approach as the best way to achieve that goal).
180
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law184—they have been more accepting of the imagined-bargain technique for
generating general legislative-style proposals for multistate conflicts.185 This
Article addresses certain scholars’ use of this grand bargain analysis and also
uses such analysis itself at various points to critique Hughes.
Larry Kramer apparently relies on such a hypothetical multistate agreement
as support for Hughes’s requirement that states entertain other states’ causes of
action.186 He asks his readers to “[i]magine a world in which courts could not
apply any law but their own.”187 The conclusion seems to follow that states
overall would agree to a general open-door rule, because allowing their own
actions to be brought in other state courts would forward their own substantive
policies. And presumably, the benefits of advancing their own substantive
interests in the courts of other states would outweigh the cost of having to open
their doors to other states’ causes of action.
The scenario of states’ not enforcing any law of other states certainly seems
unattractive. Even if one puts aside choice-of-law issues when a state takes
jurisdiction of a sister-state cause of action, and looks only to a world in which
states never take jurisdiction of each others’ causes of action, Kramer’s all-or-

184

See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 4, at 171–72 (“To be able to derive any concrete results one has
to make assumptions about the interests that the parties to the bargain would like to achieve, how strongly they
hold these interests, and how willing they would be to bargain the interests away.”); Allen & O’Hara, supra
note 183, at 1030–31 (doubting that Baxter’s analysis could predictably be applied case-by-case); Kramer,
supra note 182, at 316–18 (discussing problems with comparative impairment analysis in many choice-of-law
situations).
185 See Kramer, supra note 182, at 315–18 (using Baxter’s multistate bargain notion to help derive general
conflicts principles); cf. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at § 4.5.2, at 212–13 (suggesting that Baxter’s approach
could be usefully employed when non-adjudicators draft choice-of-law rules); Allen & O’Hara, supra note
183, at 1046 (arguing that given problems with a case-by-case Baxter approach, Baxter’s insights could lead to
reviving a modified First Restatement approach).
186 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 1987 (“Conflict of laws is, in essence, a system to enable courts from
different jurisdictions to help each other enforce their respective laws.”). In the article, Kramer footnotes
arguments he has “developed at greater length elsewhere” including in, inter alia, Rethinking Choice of Law,
supra note 182, at 311–44, in which he employs hypothetical bargain analysis. See Kramer, supra note 9, at
1987 n.93. Kramer also uses the Full Faith and Credit Clause to help generate a nondiscrimination rule for a
state’s treatment of a sister-state’s law. See id. at 1983.
187 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1987. Kramer uses this argument not specifically to support Hughes but as
support for his general nondiscrimination principle that he derives in part from Hughes. Id. at 1983–84; cf.
Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 830 (arguing that the equal access requirement of cases such as
Hughes is “a rule of necessity in American federalism” because absent such a rule, “coequal and lesser
sovereigns could completely ignore the laws of their partners and superiors”).
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nothing scenario seemingly casts Hughes in a favorable light.188 But as
discussed below, the all-or-nothing comparison may be unwarranted.
2. Problems with the Grand Bargain
When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they presumably considered
states’ mutual interests. But as discussed in Part I, they did not agree to or even
seem to contemplate that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require them
to take jurisdiction of other states’ causes of action (or perhaps even to apply
sister-state law). Nor did the course of the Court’s treatment of statutory
claims—up to and even arguably past Broderick—justify a pervasive
constitutional obligation to entertain claims under the law of other states.
Rather, it was only with Hughes that the Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause imposed such a general duty.
Given the late arrival of Hughes and the Court’s prior reliance on comity
rather than constitutional compulsion, perhaps the proper comparison with the
Hughes regime is not “a world in which courts could not”189 take jurisdiction
of other states’ causes of action. Rather, the appropriate comparison would be
the world as it existed at the time of Hughes (and as it would exist without
Hughes). In that world, the states employed nonconstitutionally compelled
doctrines of comity in deciding whether to entertain sister-state claims—just as
they had done from the founding era. And in typical cases in which a forum
state was likely to close its doors, personal jurisdiction would be available in
the state where the cause of action arose. The question then becomes: Does the
full faith and credit obligation to entertain other states’ causes of action
maximize state policies better than the nonconstitutional regime of comity that
preexisted it? Using this framework, it is not at all clear that the imagined
multistate bargain would lead to the Hughes result.
a. Incentives to Entertain Sister-State Actions Under a Comity Regime
In the hypothetical bargain, states know that they are potentially both lawsupplying states and forum states (for causes of action supplied by other
states). We first consider what bargain states would make for cases like
Hughes in which personal jurisdiction is available over the defendant in the

188 Federal courts, however, could fill in some of the gaps by following, as they did in the past, their own
jurisdictional obligation rules. See supra notes 54, 59.
189 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1987.
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law-supplying state.190 (The infrequent cases in which personal jurisdiction
over the defendant cannot be had in the law-supplying state pose different
problems, and we discuss them separately below.)
States would probably surmise that, even without any constitutional
compulsion, they have ample incentives to provide a forum for run-of-the-mill
sister-state claims.191 The desire to obtain reciprocal treatment when they are
the law-supplying state rather than the forum is one reason, but not the only
one. In addition, states, as forums, may want to give plaintiffs or defendants
who are residents the advantages of a home forum, and perhaps even to
provide work for in-state attorneys.192
b. Reasons Why Forums May Wish Not to Entertain Some Sister-State
Actions
States as forums may also have reasons to close their doors to other states’
causes of action—an option that Hughes narrows.193 States appropriately see
one of the primary institutional roles of their courts as expounding and
applying their own state’s law; state courts lack this important policymaking
role with respect to other states’ law. States therefore may wish to focus
judicial resources on claims arising under their own laws.
Out-of-state claims not only provide fewer benefits in terms of supplying
decisions on in-state law, but they also bring added costs. The forum will have
to apply out-of-state substantive law and perhaps consider adjusting local
190 See Jordan, supra note 8, at 1792–93 (arguing that the narrower availability of personal jurisdiction
was a reason for requiring states to hear the claims of other states, but that the nondiscrimination rule should
be reconsidered in light of expanded personal jurisdiction); id. at 1812 (indicating that the interpretation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause should be updated to reflect “contemporary realities”).
191 Cf. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1026–27 (1991) (indicating that states
generally have incentives to cooperate, and thus have been reluctant to adopt a straight forum-preference rule
for true conflicts); Kramer, supra note 182, at 314 (indicating that even narrowly self-interested states would
apply the law of other states in true conflicts to invite reciprocal treatment). But cf. Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E.
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1177 (2000) (arguing that
Kramer did not take into account the practical problems of implementing reciprocity, particularly in light of
states’ incentives to favor local litigants and the inability to sanction defection).
192 In addition, states have an interest in furthering justice, and may be loath to deny jurisdiction if it is
unclear whether the plaintiff can obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in the law-supplying state. This is
particularly true where the plaintiff asserts widely accepted rights of tort, property, and contract. See, e.g., First
Nat’l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 397 (1952) (involving an Illinois statute that excluded
actions for out-of-state deaths so long as the case could be pursued in the state of the death). For purposes of
the analysis immediately above, however, we have assumed that jurisdiction is available in the law-supplying
state. We consider deviating assumptions below.
193 We refer interchangeably to state interests and state-court interests.
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procedures and remedies to the different bells and whistles attached to sisterstate-claims.194 In addition, witnesses and evidence may be less likely to be
found in the forum if the plaintiff’s claim arose outside the forum state. These
concerns become exacerbated when the forum dislikes the other state’s
policies, which is more likely to occur when the plaintiff is asserting sisterstate statutory causes of action that are less widely accepted and uniform than
traditional transitory common law claims.
These forum-centric reasons for door closing, however, correspond
considerably with comity-serving reasons. In their potential role as forums,
state courts may readily conclude that law-supplying states would prefer, or at
least would not be averse to, self-application of law. Stated differently, in the
grand bargain, states in their role as law suppliers are happy to apply, or at
least not averse to applying, their own law.195 Again, this follows from state
courts’ important role as expositors of the law of a particular state.196
Scholars such as Lea Brilmayer and Stefan Underhill (whose views we
discuss more fully in Part V.C) have noted that deference to another state’s
desire to apply its own law is a valid reason for the forum to close its doors in
particular cases that are recognized exceptions to the Hughes requirement, such
as those involving divorce and corporate governance.197 But the interest in selfapplication of law is perhaps more pervasive, given state courts’ role in
delineating the law of a particular state.

194 Cf. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 128–29 (1904) (holding that ongoing payments
required under the Mexican law meant that the federal court in Texas should not entertain the action).
195 See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 51,
53–54 (2012) (discussing Delaware’s bundling of “substantive provisions and expert decisionmakers”); id. at
62–67 (discussing other state legislation attempting to make jurisdiction over certain matters exclusive).
196 See Verity Winship, Aligning Law and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN. L. REV. 1, 29–
40 (2014) (discussing advantages of aligning law and forum where lawmaking and expertise are implicated).
197 See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 151 (“The case is directed to another state for adjudication
because the other state is more qualified; the difference in treatment may superficially seem discriminatory but
is in fact deferential to the state creating the claim.”); id. at 152–53 (arguing that domestic relations and
criminal law exceptions suggest that “dismissal is appropriate whenever the difference in treatment is based on
the other state’s desire to hear the case in its own courts,” as in the case of “localizing statutes” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836–38 (making similar arguments); cf.
Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges
and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1383 (1960) (“[A state’s use of forum non conveniens] evinces a decent
respect for the interests of other states. In migratory personal-injury litigation there is usually another state that
has at least a latent interest in protecting the defendant against the hazards of the plaintiff’s forum-shopping,
and in having the case tried in its own courts.”).
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This delineation includes both the reach of rights and their limitations.
Justice Black’s Hughes opinion refers to the “maximum enforcement in each
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister
states.”198 But the law-supplying state’s interest in enforcing its laws is not so
much in the “maximum” enforcement—at least in the sense of maximizing the
plaintiff’s chances of recovery. Rather the law-supplying state presumably
wants its law enforced the way the law-supplying state would enforce it—both
with respect to rights and limitations on those rights. The obvious way to
ensure that law will be applied the way the law-supplying state would apply it
is for litigation to occur in the law-supplying state, with its own procedures,
judges, and juries.199 State attempts to confine jurisdiction of their causes of
action to their own courts, as well as federal abstention doctrines200 all
manifest the notion that the law-supplying sovereignty in many instances
prefers, or is not averse to, administration by its own instrumentalities.
In summary, we assume a hypothetical multistate bargain in which states
consider whether to have a mandatory door-opening rule versus a comity
regime for the typical case where personal jurisdiction is available in the lawsupplying state. States as potential forums in a comity regime have incentives
to open their doors, but may sometimes have interests in closing them to
particular types of cases. States as law-suppliers may prefer, or at least are not
averse to, self-application of law. If these suppositions are plausible, then there
seems little ground for concluding that states would necessarily prefer a
constitutionalized mandatory open-door policy to the comity regime that long
preexisted Hughes.
c. Should Substantive Policies Trump Procedure?
Larry Kramer, however, has made an argument in a different context—that
of suggesting general rules for choice of law—that might help the states’
imagined bargain come out in favor of Hughes rather than the comity regime.
198

Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
The current role of federal courts in diversity is more or less to enforce state law the way states would
enforce it, but absent the potential bias against out-of-staters. See John Harrison, Federal Appellate
Jurisdiction over Questions of State Law in State Courts, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 353, 358 (2004) (treating the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction as to provide “the real law of the state,” which is the law that state courts
apply between in-staters, in cases that “present no temptation to distort that law”).
200 See Jordan, supra note 8, at 1811 (arguing that a state’s not taking jurisdiction of other states’ claims
or of federal claims should be treated like abstention). Doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion in
administrative law also suggest the desirability of directing cases to the decisionmaker who has been delegated
power to administer a particular law.
199
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He argues that one should assume that states overall prefer to forward their
substantive policies over their procedural policies.201 While he does not
specifically apply this argument to the jurisdictional question, the argument
would be that the states have a greater interest in advancing enforcement of
their substantive statutes in sister states by the Hughes open-door requirement
than they have in applying their procedural rules that would allow them to
close their doors to out-of-state claims absent Hughes.
But so long as personal jurisdiction over the defendant is available in the
law-supplying state, door closing by other states does not significantly frustrate
the substantive policies of the law-supplying state. Indeed, if door closing leads
to the action’s being brought in the courts of the law-supplying state, that
state’s substantive interests in the “correct” application of its law is advanced.
Interests of states as law-suppliers in advancing their substantive policies
through open-door policies therefore cannot reliably be characterized as
weightier than their arguably more “procedural” interests in door closing. It
thus seems difficult to conclude that states are clearly better off with the rules
of Hughes than the comity regime that it supplanted.
d. Where No Alternative Forum Is Available
So long as there is an available forum in the law-supplying state, or perhaps
some other state, then there is no significant frustration of the law-supplying
state’s policies by a forum’s door closing. If there is no obvious alternative
forum in which personal jurisdiction is available against the defendant,
however, then states’ substantive interests would be impaired by door-closing
rules.202 In a grand bargain, states therefore might agree to a door-opening rule
for cases in which the forum was the only one with personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. The shareholder actions discussed in Part II, including
Broderick v. Rosner, were cases in which personal jurisdiction against
individual shareholders would generally only be available in their state of
residence.
Nevertheless, states would also be likely to qualify this jurisdictional
requirement with a public policy exception. Indeed, there is a public policy
exception to Hughes as it stands, and one that commentators such as Brilmayer
201 Kramer, supra note 191, at 1020–21 (arguing that the states would agree that the substantive policy
wins over the procedural policy).
202 See Jordan, supra note 8, at 1797, 1805–06 (arguing that states should be under an obligation to take
federal and sister-state claims when an adequate alternative forum is unavailable).
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and Underhill favor.203 While such a public policy objection would frustrate
the policies of states in their role as law-suppliers to some extent, states would
likely find the frustration worth it in order to avoid enforcing repugnant sisterstate policies in their role as forums. Such a public policy exception is in any
event likely to frustrate only less widely accepted claims for relief—e.g., novel
statutory rights, claims to enforcement of disfavored contracts such as
covenants not to compete, or claims where the law-supplying state has
expansive standing.
At the same time, due process jurisprudence suggests that states could not
assert a public policy objection to a small category of cases. Decisional law
suggests that states must maintain an adequate system of remedies for at least
intentional deprivations of traditional interests in person and property, as
opposed to mere statutory violations.204 This law has developed primarily in
suits against government officials. But because the due process obligations
arose from traditional common law actions whose reach was not limited to
government actors, it arguably follows that adequate systems of remedies for
intentional deprivations—e.g., assault, battery, and conversion—must be
available against private parties as well.205 Disallowing a public policy
objection for such claims in cases where no alternative forum was available
would be consonant with the Court’s decision in Broderick, in which no
alternative forum was likely, and in which the Court relied on the contractual
claim as being one that no state could have a legitimate policy against.206

203 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836 (noting that the public policy exception calls for
maximum enforcement of other states’ laws “consistent with the maintenance of the forum’s sovereignty”).
204 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 328–29 (1993) (suggesting there may be property interests that a state is
compelled to recognize).
205 See, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (“No one would contend that a law of a
State, forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the courts of the
United States, for that would be to deprive one of his property without due process of law.”); John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 614 (2005) (indicating that interests in “bodily integrity,” “liberty of movement,”
and “ownership of tangible property” that were injured by intentional misconduct would have strong claims to
constitutional protection); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 162 (1997) (“[L]ying behind the background assumption that there is some
constitutional compulsion for remedies for governmental trespasses is a further assumption that there must be a
system of state remedies for private trespasses.”). Obviously the necessity of remedies for certain wrongs does
not preclude the constitutional permissibility of certain defenses to liability.
206 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935). An episodic denial of relief would not necessarily
violate this due process norm. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 311 (stating that “[t]he ultimate commitment of
the law of due process remedies . . . is to create schemes and incentives adequate to keep government, overall

WOOLHANDLER_COLLINS GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

JURISDICTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

5/27/2014 11:22 AM

1067

In summary, states would likely agree to entertain one another’s claims
where an alternative forum was unavailable, subject to a public policy
exception. Yet the public policy exception would be unavailable for certain
core claims of private right—such as intentional deprivations of traditional
interests in life, liberty, and property. The constitutional obligation to entertain
sister-state claims would therefore be to entertain claims where there is no
obvious alternative forum, and particularly where the claims have strong due
process underpinnings. Viewed in this light, the obligation of states to hear the
claims of other states derives less from a generalized constitutional obligation
of state courts to advance sister-state policies, and more from their obligation
to give individuals an opportunity to seek remedies for deprivations of
substantive rights.207
e. A Grand Bargain Favoring Plaintiffs?
Perhaps, however, one could argue that states as law suppliers, if joined
together in a multistate bargain, would not care very much whether their law
was applied the way the law-supplying state would apply it, and thus would
favor a door-opening regime such as that prescribed in Hughes. One might
argue, for example, that states would want to maximize the recovery of homestate plaintiffs (i.e., citizens of the law-supplying state suing in another state)
from out-of-state defendants. An adherent to a strong form of interest analysis
might therefore argue that law-supplying states might be happy for the plaintiff
to get a larger recovery in the forum than its own courts would give, so long as
the larger recovery is likely to be imposed on out-of-staters rather than homestaters.208 But in a multistate bargain, the states’ overall interests would not be
maximized by such a policy because one state’s out-of-stater will always be
another’s home-stater.209 States therefore would not likely agree to entertain
other states’ claims based on a theory of maximizing home-state-plaintiff
recovery.

and on average, tolerably within the bounds of law”). But perhaps one could see states’ entertaining such
actions from other states when jurisdiction is otherwise lacking as a part of an overall adequate system.
207 The obligation thus would derive more from requirements of due process than from the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See supra note 205.
208 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 11, at 274–75 (noting that a preference for local citizens was “deeply
embedded” in interest analysis, and that Currie’s whole scheme “depends on his view that the interests of
outsiders do not count”—a view violating the requirement of equal treatment under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
209 See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.2, at 161 (indicating that a scheme of making outsiders pay more
“would never be adopted by a legislature acting on behalf of the nation as a whole”).
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If one puts aside an imagined policy to maximize the recovery of in-state
plaintiffs at the expense of out-of-state defendants, then one might ask whether
states would have a policy of maximizing plaintiffs’ recovery at the expense of
defendants regardless of whether the parties were in-staters or out-of-staters.
Such a policy, however, seems self-contradictory. It assumes that states as lawsuppliers have a general policy of maximum recovery for plaintiffs, even
though states as law-suppliers for cases litigated in their own courts implement
policies both favoring and limiting liability.210
Perhaps one might re-characterize the argument as a general policy
favoring plaintiff forum choice to advance plaintiffs’ convenience as opposed
to advancing plaintiffs’ overall chances of recovery. It may be difficult,
however, to separate advancing plaintiffs’ convenience from a policy of
maximizing plaintiffs’ recovery. A plaintiff-convenience rationale, moreover,
begins to weaken when one assumes (as we do) that plaintiffs have an
available forum in the law-supplying state, and perhaps in other states as well,
given the operation of comity. To reach the Hughes result, states would have to
agree that giving plaintiffs additional forum options should trump states’
control over their own jurisdiction.
Of course, if one nevertheless believes that a multistate bargain would
indeed lead states to agree to this enhance-plaintiffs’-forum-choice policy
(whether meant to maximize plaintiff recovery or convenience), then the rule
of Hughes may make sense. It is clear that Hughes advances plaintiffs’
objectives by increasing plaintiff forum options,211 even though, as we have
argued, it is not clear that the rule of Hughes maximizes other state policy
interests. Indeed, Justice Black’s positions against forum non conveniens and
in favor of wide-open personal jurisdiction over corporations212 indicate that he
saw maximizing plaintiffs’ forum choice as a worthy national policy—a policy
that he managed to constitutionalize in Hughes.
***

210 But cf. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 65–66 (1991) (arguing that plaintiff forum
choice and the application of forum law help to advance overriding concerns for enforcement that are more
fundamental than defenses).
211 Cf. Note, supra note 143, at 1210 (referring to the statute at issue in First National Bank v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952), and stating that “the blanket exclusion of residents ignored the frequent
situation in which the home forum is the most convenient place to sue”). According to this reasoning, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause protects forum residents from inconvenience—a concern that seems questionable as
one of constitutional magnitude.
212 See supra note 159.
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In summary, we believe that an imagined multistate bargain would likely
result in a comity regime rather than a Hughes regime. The states might agree
to compulsory door opening for cases where jurisdiction was only available in
the forum, but with a public policy reservation. The public policy reservation
would be unavailable, however, where the plaintiff’s claim was one for which
the Constitution might require adequate remedial systems.
C. The Nondiscrimination Rationale
If Hughes does not seem to be the necessary result of a hypothetical
bargain, then perhaps there are other reasons for its being treated as
foundational by many scholars. One reason that Hughes may have had, and
continues to have, appeal is its grounding in a notion of nondiscrimination.213
In a decision two years after Hughes, the Court stated that critical to Hughes
was that “the forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action arising within and
without the forum state.”214 Scholars, moreover, take Hughes to prescribe an
equal-protection-style analysis for the Full Faith and Credit Clause.215
According to this analysis, state rules that discriminate against out-of-state
causes of action generally are subject to a form of heightened scrutiny.216
States need a substantial reason for their line drawing and to be able to show
that the means chosen (door closing) sufficiently advance those ends;217 such
inquiries will help to smoke out possible discriminatory animus.218
213

See generally Jordan, supra note 8, at 1793–97 (arguing against use of a nondiscrimination rule as to
jurisdictional duties); id. at 1803–05 (arguing that the duty of nondiscrimination should be displaced by focus
on prejudice, to reflect contemporary realities that a state’s refusal of jurisdiction is often nonprejudicial).
214 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518–19 (1953) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not bar a Pennsylvania court from granting summary judgment under Pennsylvania’s one-year
limitations period, although the action would not have been barred in Alabama, whose substantive law
applied).
215 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1983–84 (arguing that, in Hughes, Wisconsin had used a discriminatory
means to enforce state policies).
216 See id.
217 Id. at 1984 (explaining that Hughes held that “state rules that discriminate against the laws of other
states are subject to some form of intermediate constitutional scrutiny”); cf. Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note
9, at 829–30 (positing a principle that once state courts are created “they must be open to enforce causes of
action of other equal or superior sovereigns within our federal system unless some valid reason besides ‘mere
foreignness’ can be shown”); id. at 844 (suggesting in the context of congressional discrimination against
constitutional claims that not even rational basis scrutiny would be satisfied).
218 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 831 (describing the reprobated motive of state
courts’ refusing jurisdiction as “[r]eserving courts for local law”); Kramer, supra note 9, at 1985 (“A better
explanation for Broderick is that New Jersey had tried to accomplish by subterfuge what Wisconsin had done
openly in Hughes: to advance its policy by depriving its courts of power to entertain suits based on other
states’ laws. . . . So long as the state intended to discriminate against claims based on the laws of other states,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s prohibition applies.”).
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The principle that states are not allowed to discriminate against one
another’s laws (whether in a jurisdictional or choice-of-law sense) certainly
sounds attractive. But one must be wary of treating as illicit a sovereign’s
preference for its own law and its own causes of action. Even assuming that in
some circumstances a law-supplying state may suffer a collective sense of
affront through its agents and constituents, refusal of a state to entertain a sister
state’s cause of action or to apply sister-state law does not carry a
psychological message of inferiority or second-class status—a standard
problem with most unlawful discrimination.219 Rather, states as political
communities exercising sovereignty within a particular territory routinely and
legitimately prefer their own laws and policies to those of other states, and they
expect other states to do the same.220 Accordingly, there are numerous
instances in which states are allowed to prefer their own law for the very
reason that it is their own law.221 We discuss some of these instances below.
1. Jurisdictional Discrimination and Courts of General Jurisdiction
All states have courts with the power to hear cases covering a wide variety
of subject matters, and the Supreme Court uses the notion of general
jurisdiction to support its nondiscrimination principle.222 Faced with a full faith
and credit challenge to state door closing, the Supreme Court can easily
conclude that the forum’s jurisdiction is adequate to the task of hearing the out-

219 See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 56 (2008) (discussing scholars’
concepts of wrongful discrimination as implying the lack of equal citizenship, and as involving humiliation);
id. at 57 (proposing a theory of wrongful discrimination that is defined by demeaning, which involves “a
conjunction of expressive action and power”).
220 See Kramer, supra note 182, at 312 (“But the primary concern of a State A court is and must be State A
law. State A courts are, after all, agents of State A’s citizenry and lawmakers, and their paramount
responsibility should be the implementation of State A law.”). As Jonathan Varat stated in discussing allowable
and reprobated state preferences for residents under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, “fulfillment of the
fundamental obligation of state government—to care for the state’s own residents—depends, to some illdefined degree, on the ability to withhold from others what a state chooses to provide to its own.” Jonathan D.
Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 490 (1981); see also 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-37, at 1262–64, 1268–69 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the
necessity of states’ making distinctions based on residence, and that the citizens of the state are entitled to keep
certain goods and services for themselves).
221 Indeed, it may be that a state’s duties to treat other states’ citizens as equal with its own as to certain
matters could conflict with a duty not to discriminate against sister-state laws. Cf. Kreimer, supra note 35, at
162 (discussing a state’s privileges and immunities obligation to allow nonresidents the same access to
pregnancy termination as residents, even if the nonresident’s state prohibited abortion).
222 See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 828–29 (“Once state courts are established and defined by
state legislatures, then, they must be open for actions arising under laws the forum did not create to an extent
consistent with their general jurisdiction.”).
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of-state claims, and thus that the forum is engaged in invidious discrimination
against out-of-state causes of action when it excludes them.223 At the same
time, the Court’s reliance on states’ having themselves invested their courts
with general jurisdiction seemingly respects the states’ sovereign ability to
determine the subject matter jurisdiction of their own courts.224 At first glance,
then, the concept of general subject matter jurisdiction would seem unhelpful
to our argument against a nondiscrimination principle in jurisdiction.
One may, however, question an analysis that looks to state departures from
general jurisdiction as a baseline against which to measure whether illicit
discrimination has occurred, because—as a historical matter—the notion of
general jurisdiction has been fully compatible with discrimination against outof-state causes of action. At least before Broderick and Hughes, state courts
that exercised their general jurisdiction to entertain other states’ causes of
action did so as a matter of comity, not obligation. And even after Hughes, the
notion of general jurisdiction contains many aspects of state preference for its
own law. State courts do not enforce the criminal laws of other states,225 nor
are they generally under a constitutional obligation to entertain civil
enforcement actions of other states.226 Indeed, state legislative authorization
has generally been thought necessary for state courts of general jurisdiction to
entertain the tax enforcement actions brought by officials of other states.227
Such categorical exclusions from state court general jurisdiction, moreover,
go beyond public enforcement actions. A forum is free not to entertain actions
connected to sister-state administrative proceedings even where the interested
parties are private, and also free to decline to hear other states’ workers’
compensation actions.228 As noted above, states may decline to hear divorce

223 See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951) (noting that the state had no problem with
entertaining wrongful death actions as a general matter).
224 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 829–30 (stating that although states are not required
to create any particular court system, once a state does establish courts, they must be open to enforce causes of
action of equal or superior sovereigns unless they have some valid reason beyond “mere foreignness”).
225 See HAY ET AL., supra note 148, § 3.17, at 171–72.
226 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 168–69 (N.Y. 1962) (holding that a state
court need not entertain a tax action brought by a city of a different state).
227 See, e.g., HAY ET AL., supra note 148, § 3.18, at 173 & n.4 (noting that many states had enacted
reciprocal statutes for tax collection); Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes
in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243, 293 (2011) (explaining that in today’s interstate tax-collection setting,
“most states have felt the need to enact legislation to expand their own courts’ jurisdiction to accommodate
civil enforcement actions by sister-state officials”).
228 See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 152–53 (listing and evaluating various exceptions to the
obligation to hear out-of-state claims).
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and corporate governance actions under the law of other states.229 State courts
also may decline to hear, and may have an obligation to refuse to hear, certain
local actions involving real property in other states.230 And state courts
continue to be able to exercise public policy exclusions, Hughes
notwithstanding.231 In short, courts of general jurisdiction have wellrecognized limits on their jurisdiction and its exercise when a party initiates a
claim under the law of a sister state.
As discussed above, Brilmayer and Underhill have argued that there are
special justifications for many of the categorical instances in which a state may
refuse to hear out-of-state causes of action—even though they generally
support a nondiscrimination rule. For example, as to enforcement actions, they
argue the forum should not be compelled to carry out the official business of
other states.232 But that reasoning merely points out that even courts of general
jurisdiction are law-applying arms of particular sovereignties.
In other settings, such as divorce or administrative cases, Brilmayer and
Underhill claim that such discrimination is allowed because the forum is
recognizing the law-supplying state’s strong interest in adjudicating such cases
at home.233 We have suggested above that the law-supplying state’s interest in
self-application of law is not limited to a few categories of disputes. To
distinguish categorical exceptions from the mine run of cases, Brilmayer and
Underhill’s antidiscrimination rule makes a distinction between a state’s
acceptable door closing “motivated by deference to the alternative forum”234
and reprobated door closing motivated by a desire to “[r]eserv[e] courts for
local law.”235 But as suggested above in Part IV.B.2.b, these two supposedly
distinguishable motivations come close to being two sides of the same coin. In
instances of particularized exclusions, the interest of the law-supplying state in

229 See supra text accompanying note 197; see also Winship, supra note 195, at 56–60 (discussing
problems Delaware has faced in attempting to localize corporate law); id. at 75–76 (citing instances where
sister-state courts declined to hear Delaware corporate claims, as well as instances where they entertained such
claims).
230 See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1900) (indicating that the courts of the state where
the real estate was situated had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the transmission of that property upon the
death of the owner who was a domiciliary of another state).
231 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 835–36.
232 BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 152; Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 837.
233 Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836–37.
234 BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 153.
235 Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 231.
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applying its own law is closely matched by the interest of the forum in not
applying it.236
Quite apart from whether it is possible to separate out or weigh “good”
motivation of deference to an alternative forum and “bad” motivation to prefer
the forum’s own claims, forum non conveniens doctrine suggests that the
motivation to prefer the forum’s own claims is neither bad nor illicit.237 Under
forum non conveniens analysis, it is a permissible factor counting against the
exercise of jurisdiction that the underlying cause of action arises under
nonforum law.238
Some commentators, however, distinguish forum non conveniens as not
involving discrimination against out-of-state law alone, but rather as a finegrained case-by-case inquiry into inconvenience that considers a variety of
factors.239 But the factors leading to a forum non conveniens dismissal may
frequently boil down to there being a party (particularly the plaintiff) who
resides in another state, together with a cause of action that arose in another
state and under that state’s laws.240 A forum’s denying access to an out-ofstater based on out-of-state residence alone is undoubtedly a violation of
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. And if discrimination against
out-of-state causes of action standing alone violates the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, one might expect the combination of discrimination against out-ofstaters and out-of-state causes of action to be constitutionally deadly. But
236 Indeed, in Hughes, Illinois, the law-supplying state, seemed to prefer that it be the state to entertain
suits under the Illinois wrongful death statute. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 614 (Frankurter, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that the Illinois statute provided an action for deaths occurring in Illinois); First Nat’l
Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 397 (1952) (indicating that Illinois law provided that Illinois
courts generally could not hear actions for deaths outside of Illinois); see also supra note 178 (providing more
information about First National Bank).
237 See, e.g., HAY ET AL., supra note 148, § 3.33, at 202 (“[F]orum non conveniens . . . may discriminate
against noncitizens but is useful in preventing plaintiffs from utilizing liberal jurisdictional bases to gain an
advantage . . . .”); Currie & Schreter, supra note 197, at 1383–84 (explaining that the forum non conveniens
doctrine indicates states do not have an unqualified duty to open their courts to citizens of other states, but
rather the duty is to make those residing within their borders respond to civil obligations).
238 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981); see also Winship, supra note 196,
at 15 tbl.1, 21 (listing forum non conveniens among doctrines that tend toward bundling of law and forum).
239 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 1984 (arguing that forum non conveniens operates in a more refined
manner, whereas Wisconsin’s flat rule against taking jurisdiction over wrongful death actions of other states
was “impermissibly overbroad” in that it “irrebuttably presumed” inconvenience); see also Paulson & Sovern,
supra note 44, at 976 (arguing that forum non conveniens is preferable to a state requiring similarity of a
sister-state’s statutory action to the forum’s statutory actions).
240 Cf. Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836 (“Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is
appropriate when most of the elements of the cause of action occurred outside the forum state and when none
of the parties is a citizen of the forum state.”).
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under forum non conveniens doctrine, the presence of an out-of-state cause of
action helps to neutralize the potential privileges and immunities violation.
Similar results can occur under state long-arm statutes, where the applicability
of out-of-state law is an allowable factor in denying jurisdiction.241 Thus, the
notion of state animus or discrimination against sister-state law in the
jurisdictional context may be a faulty beginning point for analysis.
If, however, one were to insist on treating discrimination against sister-state
causes of action as presumptively forbidden, and on treating such
discrimination as subject to a form of heightened or intermediate scrutiny, it is
not impossible to make arguments to explain why such discrimination is
sometimes allowed and sometimes not allowed. Intermediate scrutiny’s
requirement of a substantial justification is sufficiently malleable that it may
justify a variety of results. A Hughes proponent might therefore argue that
giving negative weight to the presence of out-of-state law in forum non
conveniens analysis is substantially justified by the forum’s and parties’
interest in avoiding inconvenient litigation, while door-closing rules lack a
similarly substantial justification.242
But one could equally plausibly conclude that the jurisdictional exclusion
at issue in Hughes (as well as in other potential door-closing cases) satisfies
such scrutiny as a form of rule-based forum non conveniens.243 The
“foreignness” of a cause of action largely overlaps with forum non conveniens
factors: witnesses, evidence, and parties located in other states.244
Larry Kramer argues that while inconvenience can be a substantial reason
for refusing jurisdiction, nevertheless, the per se rule of excluding out-of-state
wrongful death suits at issue in Hughes impermissibly “irrebuttably presumed”
inconvenience.245 Intermediate scrutiny, however, does not necessarily forbid
241 See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 151 (pointing out that state long-arm statutes tend to exclude
certain categories of nonforum causes of action); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS:
AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 494 (2d ed. 2003) (raising the question of whether state door
closing through long-arm statutes is different from Hughes).
242 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 1984.
243 The classification would by extension satisfy minimal scrutiny equal protection analysis. But cf.
CURRIE, supra note 8, at 304–07 (arguing that a state court’s refusing jurisdiction over a resident’s claim
because the injury occurred out of state would be irrational).
244 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 618–19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing possible state concerns
as to witnesses and foreign law); cf. Note, supra note 143, at 1209 (observing that “the main purpose of the
Illinois statute” that the Court invalidated in First National Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396
(1952), “was to prevent importation of litigation”).
245 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1984.
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the use of rules, despite some over- and underinclusion.246 To insist on caseby-case refusals to hear an action is to disable the state from proceeding by
general rule in those cases that may frequently enough present a forum non
conveniens type of problem. Such insistence, moreover, also may have the
effect of rejecting legislative door-closing rules in favor of more malleable
judicial standards. Yet it is generally agreed that it is desirable to resolve
jurisdictional questions by rules rather than standards.247 The various
categorical exceptions to entertaining out-of-state claims (obviously) operate
categorically, rather than asking, for example, whether a particular out-of-state
shareholder derivative action or divorce should proceed.
Those favoring an antidiscrimination norm also find support in cases such
as Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,248 in which the
Supreme Court held that state courts that entertained similar state-law actions
could not discriminate against federal causes of action under the FELA.249 One
could argue that the Court wrongly decided Mondou, because the federal
government can always supply its own courts for its own affirmative statutory
claims.250 In short, because federal causes of action need not want for a forum
even if states decline to hear them, one may question whether a
nondiscrimination norm should apply when a state declines to hear federal
statutory actions.251

246

See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56–59 (2001) (upholding a statute imposing affirmative steps
for the acquisition of citizenship by a child born abroad to a citizen father but not on a child born to a citizen
mother).
247 See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (favoring “simple jurisdictional rules” over
“complex jurisdictional tests”).
248 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
249 Id. at 59; see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731, 736–37 (2009) (rejecting even a
nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional rule that was said to be motivated by hostility to prisoners’ federal
claims).
250 See id. at 742 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause does not require a
nondiscrimination rule as to jurisdiction).
251 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 8, at 1789–90 (arguing that because federal question jurisdiction was
provided in 1875, and because personal jurisdiction has expanded, a state court’s refusal to hear a federal claim
will rarely prejudice the claim, and a nondiscrimination rule should not be applied); see also Bellia, supra note
43, at 972 (“[S]tates had interests in judicially enforcing federal actions . . . . [T]hat state courts had a power,
but not a duty, to enforce federal law . . . comported with general jurisdictional principles of the law of
nations.”); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995
WIS. L. REV. 39, 45, 144–49, 168 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause was long understood to require states
“to apply federal substantive norms that happened to be implicated in the decision of cases which state law
gave them the power to hear” but did not entail jurisdictional duties); Collins & Nash, supra note 227, at 286–
96 (arguing for the limited reach of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), in the context of state enforcement of
federal criminal law).
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But one need not take the argument so far. It is enough to point out that
Mondou was based in part on the impossibility of states’ having substantive
policies different from those of the federal government.252 By contrast, states
legitimately have policies that differ from policies of other states, and they are
in many circumstances allowed to prefer their own policies to those of other
states. Stated differently, the obligations of the Supremacy Clause may be
stronger in terms of a door-opening requirement than the obligations of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.253
2. Discrimination in Choice of Law
Any argument for a nondiscrimination rule as to state jurisdiction must also
face the constitutional allowance of discrimination against out-of-state law in
choice of law.254 When states take jurisdiction of a claim, they apply their own
conflict-of-laws rules and often do so in such a way as to prefer their own law
to sister-state law. The Court’s indulgence of such preferences was evident
prior to Hughes,255 and only increased thereafter.256 The Court’s minimal
scrutiny as to choice of law allows states to prefer their own law so long as a
plausible connection with the state exists. And even scholars such as Larry
Kramer would—as a matter of constitutional law—allow states to advance
their own policies when they have such a connection to the claim.257 If such a
naked preference is allowed in this choice-of-law context, then it is difficult to
see why the preference for one’s own causes of action for jurisdictional
purposes should be disallowed as a matter of full faith and credit.

252

Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57.
But see Haywood, 556 U.S. at 755 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for the opposite proposition).
254 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 8, at 308 (“[W]here the forum is free to apply its own . . . law it is
difficult to see what the Full Faith and Credit Clause has to do with the constitutional obligation to provide a
forum.”); FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 8, at 247 (questioning Hughes in light of Wisconsin’s having
sufficient contacts to apply its own law).
255 See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 497, 500–01 (1939), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 135–39.
256 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (finding that the interests of Minnesota,
where the plaintiff moved after her husband’s death in Wisconsin, made application of Minnesota’s insurance
law “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988)
(allowing the forum state to apply its own statute of limitations to a claim governed by the law of another
state); Borchers, supra note 8, at 160–61, 163–64 (discussing these cases as significantly qualifying a
nondiscrimination rule).
257 Kramer, supra note 182, at 335–36.
253
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V. REASONING FROM HUGHES
In Part IV, we argued that the allowance of discrimination in areas of both
jurisdiction and choice of law suggests that Hughes was wrongly decided. But
the argument might be turned around by those who favor the Hughes result—
to argue that these areas where discrimination is allowed should be brought in
line with Hughes. And some scholars have taken Hughes’s nondiscrimination
rule, with its concerns as to animus against out-of-state law, as a foundational
notion for arguments to extend the antidiscrimination principle into related
areas. Indeed, Hughes has perhaps proved to be more important as it bears on
these sorts of arguments than it has proved in changing the jurisdictional
practices of the state courts.258 We think, however, that given the problems of
Hughes, arguments for a nondiscrimination norm in other areas should stand or
fall on their own merits without reliance on Hughes. We focus on three areas in
which scholars have sought to extend Hughes’s nondiscrimination norm:
choice of law, the public policy exception, and jurisdiction stripping.
A. A Nondiscrimination Principle in Choice of Law?
Choice of law presents a strong case for a nondiscrimination rule, but does
not suggest that Hughes was correctly decided. Discrimination in choice of law
(which the Court tolerates) means that obligations arising from the same
primary behavior will vary depending on where the action is brought.259 And
258 State courts occasionally cite Hughes for the proposition that a state may not decline jurisdiction
simply because the action is a sister-state claim. See, e.g., Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557, 561
(Miss. 1988); see also Millsap v. Cent. Wis. Motor Transp. Co., 189 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)
(relying on Hughes to entertain a sister-state action for contribution). More typical are state court references to
Hughes for its uncontroversial choice-of-law statement that states are not “automatically obliged” to
subordinate their own policies to those of sister states. See, e.g., State v. Langlands, 583 S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4 (Ga.
2003); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 62 n.5 (R.I. 2005). And Hughes is routinely viewed as consistent with a
public policy objection to entertaining a sister-state claim. See, e.g., Ferreri v. Hewitt Assocs., LLC, 908
N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Texaco, Inc. v. Vanden Bosche, 219 A.2d 80, 83 (Md. 1966); McDade
v. Moynihan, 115 N.E.2d 372, 375 (Mass. 1953). More significant, perhaps, is what Hughes has not prevented
states from doing. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 169–70 (N.Y. 1962) (refusing to
entertain a sister-state claim for tax liability, Hughes notwithstanding); McGrath v. Tobin, 103 A.2d 795, 796–
97, 800 (R.I. 1954) (refusing, despite Hughes, to enforce a sister-state wrongful death statute because the
forum deemed it penal); Paper Prods. Co. v. Doggrell, 261 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tenn. 1953) (refusing to enforce
a sister-state civil action under penal law; finding Hughes “not . . . helpful” to the inquiry); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 686 (Tex. 2006) (refusing to entertain sister-state antitrust claims, but
not mentioning Hughes). And only one state court decision appears to have ever cited Hughes’s “maximum
enforcement” language. See Houston v. Whittier, 216 P.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Idaho 2009).
259 See, e.g., Allen & O’Hara, supra note 183, at 1041 (stating that primary predictability should be the
main goal of choice-of-law rules); Kramer, supra note 182, at 313 (arguing that uniform choice-of-law rules
would discourage forum shopping, and that most scholars “agree that rules facilitating this strategic behavior
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by applying its own law, the forum may significantly alter the rights and
liabilities from those that more neutral conflicts rules would generate,
suggesting opportunities for unfairness to parties.260
By contrast, jurisdictional discrimination as to causes of action (which the
Court does not tolerate) tends to promote the very uniformity that
discrimination in choice of law undermines. State door-closing rules tend to
direct claims to the state whose law most likely would govern under neutral
conflicts rules, and thereby promote uniform application of that law. Hughes
itself shows that door closing can increase uniformity in the law applicable to a
transaction, insofar as the opinion implied that Wisconsin, although its courts
were compelled to take jurisdiction of the Illinois wrongful death claim, could
constitutionally have elected to apply Wisconsin law instead.261
Because of the problems of disuniformity arising from state constitutional
freedom in the choice-of-law area, many scholars have imagined that, in a
Baxter-style grand bargain, states would agree to largely neutral conflict-oflaws rules.262 In such a context, a nondiscrimination rule would be justified
based on the premise that the states would likely agree to it. But because
disuniformity does not arise from door-closing rules, states would not
necessarily agree to the rule of Hughes on that ground.
B. Nondiscrimination as Leading to Rejection of a Public Policy Exception?
In addition to arguments for a general change in choice-of-law rules,
Hughes has been used to support arguments against a public policy exception
to applying sister-state law—both with respect to taking jurisdiction, and with
respect to choice of law in cases in which the court exercises jurisdiction.263
are undesirable”); Laycock, supra note 11, at 296, 301 (arguing that full faith and credit means that the law
governing a case should be the same wherever it is filed).
260 One inevitably faces a baseline problem in determining what the “fair” choice of law is. See Kramer,
supra note 182, at 313 n.117.
261 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 209, 612 n.10 (1951) (distinguishing the case from those in which the
state court chooses to apply its own law).
262 See Kramer, supra note 182, at 315 (arguing that in an ideal world, states would negotiate rules to
resolve true conflicts); cf. Laycock, supra note 11, at 322–23 (arguing that some form of uniform territorialbased rules should govern).
263 The most-objected-to use of a public policy exception is in choice of law, when a court uses liability
rules of another state while refusing to apply certain sister-state defenses. See Kramer, supra note 9, at 1973–
74 (indicating that public policy exceptions are more innocuous when they result in denials of jurisdiction
rather than taking the case and applying forum law); Jordan, supra note 8, at 1804–05 (finding public policy
objections to be generally acceptable when refusing jurisdiction, but opposing their use to foreclose defenses
due to their prejudicial effect on the claim). While Kramer and Laycock both are more focused on choice of
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Both Douglas Laycock and Larry Kramer have argued against the use of such
an exception.264 For example, Laycock has argued that the equal status of
sister-state law required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes a state
from rejecting sister-state law “on the ground that it too deeply offends the
public policy of the forum.”265
The move from Hughes to foreclosing a public policy exception is perhaps
logical, if one assumes that Hughes and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
manifest a general principle that states cannot treat out-of-state law less
favorably than their own law for either jurisdictional or choice-of-law
purposes. If sister-state law must be treated on an equal footing with forum
law, it arguably would follow that the forum court should not be able to refuse
to accord jurisdiction to a cause of action based on an out-of-state statute or
otherwise refuse to apply that statute based on a public policy objection.266
This suggestion becomes complicated, however, when one takes into
account that states are allowed to discriminate in choice of law. While arguing
against a public policy exception in the choice-of-law area, Kramer accepts
that a forum is constitutionally allowed to advance its own policies in
preference to those of other states when the forum has sufficient connection to
the lawsuit.267 Kramer sought to work his way around this apparent
contradiction by assuming that a state was free to apply its own (possibly
discriminatory) choice-of-law rules, but could not make a public policy
exception to the application of those rules. He was particularly focused on
states’ refusals to recognize same-sex marriages that were valid under the laws
of the place of celebration.268 For him, when a state’s ordinary choice-of-law
rules for recognition of marriages (e.g., place of celebration) would point to the
application of sister-state law, thereby indicating that the forum has insufficient
interest to apply its own law, then the forum would not be allowed to

law than on jurisdiction, their arguments against public policy exceptions would seem to encompass both
jurisdictional and choice-of-law situations.
264 Kramer, supra note 9, at 1980; Laycock, supra note 11, at 313.
265 Laycock, supra note 11, at 313.
266 For example, under that view, a forum court could not refuse to apply a forum-state statute (either
providing a cause of action or some other aspect of law) due to a subconstitutional public policy objection to
the statute. Similarly, the forum court could not refuse to apply controlling authority from a higher court in the
state due to a public policy objection.
267 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 1967 (explaining this principle in the context of marriage law).
268 See id.
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discriminate against the content of out-of-state law based on a public policy
objection (e.g., to same-sex marriage).269
Kramer’s critics have raised a number of objections to his analysis. They
argue that he has taken insufficient account of the choice-of-law cases that
qualify the Hughes nondiscrimination rule itself.270 The public policy
exception in the interjurisdictional marriage cases, they argue, fits comfortably
within interest analysis, because the forum has a sufficient interest to apply its
own law when at least one of the parties resides in the state.271 A public policy
exception, moreover, has traditionally been available, and is an essential part
of the place-of-celebration rule.272 What is more, consideration of the content
of the law is inherent in interest analysis despite Kramer’s claim that choiceof-law doctrines generally attempt to avoid evaluation of the content of law.273
Ultimately, many of these critics argue that full faith and credit is not the
appropriate avenue for requiring states to recognize same-sex marriage. Rather,
any such requirement would be more appropriately located in equal protection
269 Id.; cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (relying in part on the respect generally
given state marriage law in evaluating the federal government’s blanket refusal to recognize same-sex
marriages for purposes of federal law). There is debate whether Windsor would require states to recognize
sister-state same-sex marriages. See William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same Sex Marriage After
Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 154–55 (2013) (suggesting that one of Windsor’s “lines of reasoning,”
which focuses on liberty interests and equal treatment provides “some support” for a right to interstate samesex marriage recognition, while its other line of reasoning, which focuses on federalism, does not, “and may
even cut against it”). Even if Windsor can be read as requiring such recognition, however, it would not be as a
consequence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but as a consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
protection (at the state level) of liberty interests and equal treatment. If so, the Fourteenth Amendment would
be acting as a trump on the ordinary allowance under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of a public policy
objection to recognition of sister-state marriages.
270 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 8, at 160–61, 173–78; Maltz, supra note 97, at 535–36; Richard S.
Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 531, 546 (2005).
271 See, e.g., Myers, supra note 270, at 544–45 (explaining that in the context of interjurisdictional
marriage disputes, the forum is using the public policy exception consistently with interest analysis); Linda J.
Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism
Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191, 192, 198–201 (1996) (indicating that states have long rejected marriages
on public policy grounds and that the state of domicile has the strongest interest in applying its law).
272 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 8, at 155 (discussing the long history of a public policy exception to the
place-of-celebration rule); see also FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 8, at 249 (asking, with respect to Kramer’s
argument that Hughes can be read as supporting a nondiscrimination rule that prohibits states from using
public policy exceptions, “Can the molehill of Hughes support this mountainous reasoning?”).
273 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 8, at 170 (“[T]o the extent Kramer’s argument purports to deny courts
the ability to consider [states’] substantive preferences in making choice-of-law decisions, it runs counter to
what courts have done since the [conflict-of-laws revolution] began.”); Myers, supra note 270, at 538–39
(arguing that use of the public policy exception was a precursor to interest analysis, and pointing to Paulson &
Sovern, supra note 44).
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or fundamental rights analysis.274 Stated differently, the question should be
framed as whether there is a state duty of nondiscrimination against certain
classes of people or whether there is a substantive right to same-sex marriage,
rather than as a question of whether there is a state duty of nondiscrimination
as to the law of other states.
What is more, the hypothetical multistate bargain—a methodology Kramer
often employs—would not necessarily result in the demise of a robust public
policy exception to choice-of-law rules, even if it would result in otherwise
uniform and nondiscriminatory choice-of-law rules. We argued above that
states would likely reserve a public policy exception as to any jurisdictional
obligations;275 that argument would apply to choice-of-law obligations as well.
Some potential frustration of each state’s substantive policies through
nonenforcement of their own law in sister states might be an acceptable tradeoff for states’ not having to enforce repugnant causes of action and law of
sister states.
Thus, one may surmise that a grand bargain would likely result in a
nondiscrimination rule as to choice of law (which the Court does not currently
require), with a public policy exception (which is allowed under current
practice). At the same time, states likely would not agree to a
nondiscrimination rule as distinguished from a comity regime in according
jurisdiction. States, however, likely would agree to entertain each other’s
claims when no other forum was available, but subject to a public policy
exception,276—which, in turn, would be unavailable when certain
constitutionally required relief was at stake.

274 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 97, at 542 (noting that although there might be strong doctrinal arguments
for same-sex marriage given the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination and marriage jurisprudence, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause should not be distorted to reach that end); cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (relying on
Fifth Amendment liberty and equality principles).
275 See supra text accompanying notes 203–06. Indeed, DOMA itself is some evidence that the states
would not bargain away the public policy exception.
276 As Brilmayer and Underhill have stated in the jurisdictional context, “The public policy exception to
this clause [Full Faith and Credit] insures that the forum’s sovereignty will not be impaired by the
‘extraterritorial application’ of another state’s policies.” Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 836 (footnote
omitted); see also BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 153 (“The important question is whether the dismissal
is motivated by deference to the alternative forum and by the needs of the interstate judicial system as a
whole.”).
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C. Jurisdiction Stripping and Nondiscrimination?
1. The Argument for Use of a Nondiscrimination Principle
Finally, some have argued for extension of the Hughes nondiscrimination
rule into the realm of federal courts law—that is, into the “jurisdiction
stripping” debate. The central question of this debate is whether Congress can
cut back the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and/or lower federal courts
when it dislikes the constitutional decisions of those courts. The question thus
is more squarely addressed to jurisdictional, not choice-of-law, issues. The
traditional view is that Congress has considerable power to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and that it may selectively exclude certain
classes of claims from those courts in favor of state courts, based on its
hostility toward those rights as interpreted by the federal courts.277
Despite their general acceptance of a public policy exception in the choiceof-law setting,278 Lea Brilmayer and Stephan Underhill argue that full faith and
credit cases such as Hughes manifest a general principle that courts cannot
discriminate against the law of equal and superior sources of law.279 They find
additional support for their nondiscrimination principle in Supremacy Clause
cases,280 in which the Court has required state courts to entertain federal
statutory claims.281
Brilmayer and Underhill recommend translation of this conflict-of-laws
nondiscrimination rule to the jurisdiction-stripping debate.282 They argue that
the notion of nondiscrimination against equal or higher sources of law means
that Congress cannot discriminate against constitutional rights in its
jurisdictional statutes. Separation of powers principles require that other
political and judicial institutions treat Supreme Court constitutional decisions
as binding, and thus as a higher source of law than congressional legislation. If
Congress carved out particular constitutional claims from the federal courts’

277 See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892–96 (2008)
(describing the traditional view).
278 See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 7, at 835–36.
279 See id. at 821, 825.
280 See, e.g., Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1912) (requiring states to
entertain claims brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
393–94 (1947) (requiring state courts to entertain claims brought under the Emergency Price Control Act).
281 See Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 9, at 838–40.
282 Id. at 821, 831 (analogizing to the Full Faith and Credit and Supremacy Clause cases, but premising
their claim on the “supremacy principle announced in Marbury v. Madison”).
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jurisdiction without also excluding analogous statutory claims, they argue that
the exclusion should be struck down as discrimination against a higher source
of law.283 The only plausible explanation for a distinction between
constitutional and statutory claims, they further argue, would be a reprobated
hostility or discriminatory purpose against higher law.284 Their discrimination
test would therefore invalidate jurisdiction-stripping statutes that were so
motivated, whether directed to the Supreme Court alone, the lower federal
courts alone, or the two together.285
2. Critique of the Use of a Nondiscrimination Principle
We have argued that a Hughes-derived notion of nondiscrimination against
the law of other sovereigns is not a solid foundational principle in the doorclosing setting, in part because states may legitimately prefer their own law to
that of other states in many circumstances.286 In the jurisdiction-stripping
context, a similar argument exists that Congress may in many instances
legitimately be hostile to court-announced constitutional decisions.287
Madisonian separation of powers contemplates a measure of interbranch
hostility—hostility that inherently encompasses the source (in another branch)
and content of decisions (i.e., not the same decision that this particular branch
would make).288 Article III’s allowing for congressional choices between state
and federal courts seems to entail an idea that Congress can make such choices
based on a preference for the source and content of state court determinations

283 Id. at 846–47 (indicating that congressional jurisdiction rules must be neutral as between statutory and
constitutional claims).
284 Id. at 833 & n.73 (indicating that the facial discrimination between statutes and the Constitution would
prove the reprobated purpose “because any plausible explanation of the bills’ purpose [would] be
illegitimate”); id. at 844–46 (arguing that hostility to constitutional rights, or substantive disagreement with the
court-articulated content of rights, does not supply a rational basis for the discrimination).
285 Id. at 848.
286 We similarly have doubts about the extent to which state courts have duties to take jurisdiction of
federal statutory causes of action, although we have alluded to those arguments only briefly in this Article. See
supra text accompanying notes 248–51.
287 See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV.
1030, 1036 (1982).
288 See, e.g., id. at 1037 (arguing that it is legitimate for Congress to express concerns about substantive
constitutional matters through jurisdiction regulation); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 21 n.10 (1981) (collecting scholarship to the effect that Congress’s
possible powers to strip jurisdiction promote a healthy dialogue between the Court and Congress); id. at 39
n.63 (collecting sources that see the threat of jurisdiction stripping as an appropriate majoritarian check that
enhances Court legitimacy).
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over the source and content of federal court determinations.289 The
Constitution treats state courts as adequate substitutes for federal courts for the
resolution of most federal issues—including constitutional questions—even if
Congress perceives they might enforce those rights differently from the federal
courts.290 That such rearrangements may lead to enforcement in state courts
that is diluted (or enhanced) from what it would be in federal court is an
inevitable result of congressional jurisdictional choice.291 Thus, the traditional
position of federal courts scholars on jurisdiction stripping has been that
Congress has near plenary power,292 with only a few exceptions.293 And if
interbranch hostility is inherent in separation of powers, it would seem to
follow that congressional “discrimination” against the Court’s constitutional
precedent does not in itself make out a constitutional violation.
Richard Fallon, however, has recently argued for a purpose test in
jurisdiction stripping that may be subject to fewer objections than Brilmayer
and Underhill’s discrimination test.294 Just as they do, Fallon assumes that our
constitutional system requires that the other federal and state branches of
government treat Supreme Court constitutional decisions as binding.295 The
289 Bator, supra note 287, at 1035–36 (arguing that Article III grants Congress the power to discriminate
based on different subject matters); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 917–18 (1984) (arguing
against a notion that Congress’s singling out of classes of issues is suspect: “The central problem is that it too
readily extends the analysis of the obvious flaw in laws that distinguish among litigants on the basis of race or
other forbidden criteria to jurisdictional statutes that differentiate on the basis of subject matter”). But cf.
Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498,
516 (1974) (arguing that the only legitimate reason for Congress to curtail federal jurisdiction is to address
docket overloads).
290 See Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal
Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 156–57 (1982) (arguing that
“constitutional history . . . has always assumed that state courts” were equal to “federal courts as protectors of
constitutional rights”).
291 Gunther, supra note 289, at 918 (stating that, given Article III, Congress’s assigning some issues to
state courts does not “‘discriminate against,’ or ‘burden,’ or ‘prejudice’ the rights involved”).
292 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (concluding that state courts are the ultimate
guarantors of constitutional rights).
293 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 287, at 1034 (noting equal protection-type exclusions); Gunther, supra note
289, at 910 (noting that all agree that Congress cannot dictate outcomes in constitutional cases, nor require a
court to decide a case in disregard of the Constitution).
294 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1052 (2010). We
primarily address Fallon’s arguments, and do not purport to address here the whole of the jurisdiction-stripping
literature.
295 See id. at 1075 (proceeding from the premise that “following an attempted stripping of federal
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s precedents would remain binding on state courts as a matter of law”); see
also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 877 &
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purpose that Fallon treats as illicit, however, is not “discrimination” or unequal
treatment between constitutional and statutory rights, but rather an “evident
purpose . . . to invite state court defiance of past authoritative Supreme Court
decisions.”296 For Fallon, lower court jurisdiction stripping would generally be
constitutionally acceptable because inviting defiance of Supreme Court
precedent would “be both an unlikely congressional motivation for, and
unlikely result of, jurisdiction-stripping that left Supreme Court review of state
court judgments intact.”297
As his statement suggests, Fallon is concerned not only with purpose but
also effect—effective abrogation of Supreme Court precedent. Fallon argues
that Congress should not be able to achieve indirectly “aims that the
Constitution would forbid the government to pursue directly.”298 Because
Congress’s direct abrogation of constitutional rights and remedies by
legislation would be subject to constitutional scrutiny, so too should its attempt
to accomplish the same end through jurisdiction stripping.
Fallon’s concern for effective abrogation of constitutional precedent—and
by extension constitutional rights—might suggest, however, that the actual
effects on constitutionally necessary remedies, rather than the intent of
Congress, should be the principal indicia of unconstitutionality. Consider, for
example, that Congress “directly” reduced remedies available to prisoners in
the Prison Litigation Reform Act.299 The main question in determining the
validity of such a direct reduction of remedies for constitutional violations is
whether the remaining remedies are constitutionally adequate rather than
whether Congress intended to reduce such remedies.300 If Congress were to
n.33 (2011) (citing authorities for the obligation of lower courts to follow Supreme Court precedent); Sager,
supra note 288, at 68 (arguing that Congress should not be able to “undo the Supreme Court’s constitutional
doctrine . . . by manipulating federal jurisdiction”). But cf. Fallon, supra note 294, at 1062, 1086 (expressing
some reservations about arguing from the federal courts’ role as ultimate arbiters of the Constitution); John
Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 504–05 (2000) (arguing that
Congress could change existing rules of precedent).
296 Fallon, supra note 294, at 1052; see also Sager, supra note 288, at 42 (arguing that “Congress cannot
selectively remove federal jurisdiction to achieve unconstitutional substantive ends”); id. at 68–69 (arguing
that Congress, by jurisdiction stripping, would be inviting illegality by the states).
297 Fallon, supra note 294, at 1095.
298 Id. at 1081; see also Sager, supra note 294, at 68 (“Congress ordinarily cannot undo the Supreme
Court’s constitutional doctrine by simple legislative fiat, and it should not be able to accomplish the same end
by manipulating federal jurisdiction.”).
299 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) (prohibiting damages for emotional distress absent physical injury in suits
by prisoners).
300 Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347 (2000) (noting that “the PLRA has restricted courts’ authority
to issue and enforce prospective relief concerning prison conditions,” and assuming, without deciding, that the
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seek to reduce remedies “indirectly” to prisoners by stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction, presumably the central question should be the same (given the
premise that Congress should not be able to accomplish indirectly what it
cannot accomplish directly)—namely, whether the remedies that remain are
constitutionally adequate.
Fallon’s purpose test, however, might be justified because it may be
difficult to prove effects when Congress acts by jurisdiction stripping rather
than by directly altering rights and remedies. As Fallon states, “When
important constitutional values are at stake, and it is difficult for the Supreme
Court to agree on an alternative test of constitutional validity to protect those
values, purpose tests provide a minimal protection against abuses of
governmental power.”301 Concern for substantive constitutional rights, rather
than concern for “discrimination,” therefore seems to be at the heart of Fallon’s
approach. His approach thus does not share Brilmayer and Underhill’s problem
of treating constitutionally contemplated interbranch hostility in itself as
constitutionally off-limits.
Even if one accepted Fallon’s approach to federal jurisdiction stripping,
however, such acceptance would not entail a conclusion that Hughes v. Fetter
was rightly decided. An analogous purpose test in the door-closing context
would need to find justification in a concern that state door closing
significantly impairs substantive entitlements of the plaintiffs under the laws of
the sister states. But in Hughes and similar cases, jurisdiction was available in
the law-supplying state, whose courts structurally are the most capable of
enforcing those rights “accurately.”
In some classes of cases, however, declining jurisdiction may indeed
undermine the enforcement of substantive rights under the laws of the sister
state because the forum is the only state in which personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is possible. This was true in Broderick v. Rosner—discussed in
Part II—where it was unlikely that the shareholder liabilities could be enforced
against shareholders outside their domicile, and where the Court considered the
new standards were effective); id. at 348, 350 (holding that the automatic stay provisions did not violate
separation of powers). But cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (O’Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (disallowing state abortion regulations imposing undue burdens, defined by a “purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”). The
“purpose or effect” language arguably allows invalidation of an abortion regulation based on legislative
purpose alone, without reference to whether abortion availability was reduced below what is constitutionally
required.
301 Fallon, supra note 294, at 1081.
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contractual liability to be one of near-constitutional significance. As we have
argued above, states, pursuant to a multistate bargain, might agree to hear
sister-state claims lacking an alternative forum, while reserving a public policy
exception. But any public policy exception to this limited duty to entertain
sister-state claims would itself be limited by notions that certain remedies are
constitutionally required.
CONCLUSION
States historically entertained one another’s transitory actions as a matter of
comity and not obligation. The Court’s imposition of a full faith and credit
obligation in Broderick v. Rosner was more a reflection of the Court’s
commitment to the enforcement of contractual obligations between the parties
than a commitment to the enforcement of public policies among the states
themselves. Hughes v. Fetter’s later imposition of a more general requirement
that states entertain lawsuits that arise under sister-state law is better explained
as a decision that maximizes plaintiffs’ forum choices, rather than as a decision
that maximizes the policies of the states. As such, Hughes has little to do with
the interstate concerns of full faith and credit, or any other constitutional
principle. Moreover, as we have argued, Hughes’s nondiscrimination rationale
fits poorly with states’ allowable preferences for enforcement of their own
laws, full faith and credit notwithstanding. And finally, we conclude that
arguments that courts should extend nondiscrimination norms as to the law of
other sovereigns should stand or fall on their own merits, without reliance on
Hughes.

